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Abstract
I discuss three observations about backtracking counterfactuals not predicted by exist-
ing theories, and then motivate a theory of counterfactuals that does predict them. On
my theory, counterfactuals quantify over a suitably restricted set of historical possibil-
ities from some contextually relevant past time. I motivate each feature of the theory
relevant to predicting our three observations about backtracking counterfactuals. The
paper concludes with replies to three potential objections.
Consider the following situation (cf. Jackson 1977): you see your friend Smith on the roof
of a twenty story building, poised to jump. There is nothing underneath him besides the
solid concrete of the sidewalk. You feel anxiety and fear—you do not want your friend to
die! Trying to regain composure, you remind yourself that you know Smith and know that
he is rational, has no wish to die, and knows that (since there is nothing underneath him)
jumping in such circumstances will kill him. Reflecting on this, you think: he is not going
to jump. Thankfully, just as you predict, Smith steps down off the ledge and descends the
stairs, exiting the building safely. Relieved, you say, ‘Thank goodness,
(1) If Smith had jumped, he would have died.’
It seems clear that the counterfactual you utter is true. Furthermore, that (1) is true seems
to be why it is appropriate to feel relief when Smith does not jump; it also seems to be
why your anxiety that he might jump is reasonable in light of the circumstances.1
Now, Beth is also on the scene, and hears you utter (1). Beth objects on the following
grounds. ‘Smith was rational, had no wish to die, could see below him, and knew that
1I have in mind something like the following: feeling relief that ¬p is appropriate iff things would have
been worse off had p occurred (or perhaps iff you believe things would have been worse off had p occurred).
Some sort of counterfactual comparison seems to be a property of emotive factive verbs generally (compare
regret, resent) and may be related to the fact that emotive factious seem to presuppose knowledge (not just
truth) of their complements—see for instance Zuber 1977.
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jumping without a net would kill him,’ Beth says. ‘Therefore, had Smith jumped, there
would already have been a net below him to catch him safely.2 Hence,
(2) If Smith had jumped, he would have lived.’
I submit that Beth has made a pretty good case against (1) and for (2)—though perhaps
one that would not convince you that your earlier anxiety was misplaced. Maybe you say:
‘I know all those things about Smith. But there was no net underneath him! Hence, (1).’
Perhaps Beth remains unconvinced, and the discussion continues for several more rounds.
Backtracking counterfactuals have been discussed, often as an oddity to be set aside, in
many places.3 The aim of this paper is to give backtracking counterfactuals their due. Here
is the plan for what follows. In §1, I draw three important observations about backtracking
and non-backtracking counterfactuals, observations which a plausible theory of the meaning
of counterfactuals ought to predict. In §2, I draw on the three observations to raise a
challenge to the most well-known ‘similarity theory’ of counterfactuals (e.g., Stalnaker
1968, Lewis 1973a, 1979a). The challenge is to predict these observations without making
ad hoc stipulations, and I know of no existing theory that does so. In §3, I turn to
an alternative theory of counterfactuals on which they quantify over alternative histories
‘branching’ from the actual world at some past time.4 According to my favored version
of the ‘historical modality’ theory, there are two contextual parameters relative to which
the truth of a counterfactual is evaluated: a time, and a set of salient propositions. In §4,
I combine this theory with two independently motivated pragmatic principles of speaker
interpretation; these principles predict default settings for these two contextual parameters
and also allow that in certain conditions these defaults may be overridden. I show that
the resulting theory predicts our three observations. Finally, in §5, I consider how my
theory compares with David Lewis’s similarity theory and respond to several objections.
Although my main goal is to articulate a plausible theory of counterfactuals that predicts
our four observations about backtracking counterfactuals, a related secondary goal is to
illustrate the usefulness of adopting a historical modality theory of counterfactuals, thus
2Or, ‘had Smith jumped, there would have to have been a net below him to catch him safely,’ or ‘Smith
would have jumped only if there had been a net below him to catch him safely’.
3See for instance, Downing 1959, Jackson 1977, Lewis 1979a, Bennett 1984, 2003
4Cf. Jackson 1977, Tedeschi 1981, Thomason & Gupta 1980, Thomason 1985, Bennett 2003, Ippolito
2003, 2006, 2013b, Arregui 2005b, 2007, 2009, Placek & Mu¨ller 2007. Note that such theories need not take
any stand on the metaphysics of time. They may understand the history structures as genuine branching
or as a bundling of distinct worlds with overlapping pasts.
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providing additional support for such theories.
1 Three observations
Let us fix some terminology and draw some observations. Restricting attention to coun-
terfactuals about events for this paper, we distinguish forward from backward coun-
terfactuals, and distinguish backtracking from non-backtracking interpretations of the
former.5 Forward counterfactuals are those whose antecedents are about events which take
place before the events their consequents are about, while backward counterfactuals are
non-forward (those whose antecedents are about events that overlap or take place after
the events their consequents are about).6 (1) is a forward counterfactual that is true only
on a non-backtracking interpretation, while (2) is a forward counterfactual true only on a
backtracking interpretation. Here is a rough intuitive gloss of the two interpretations. In
evaluating a non-backtracking interpretation of a forward counterfactual, one ‘punches’ its
antecedent-event into the causal history of the world and then plays things out from there
to see whether its consequent is thereby made true. Such a procedure results in holding
fixed the fact that there is nothing underneath Smith during his jump when evaluating
(1), which is why it comes out true on its non-backtracking interpretation. In evaluating
a backtracking interpretation of a forward counterfactual, by contrast, one does a bit of
‘detective work’ to figure out in what circumstances its antecedent would have been true,
and then, making the requisite changes to history to bring about its antecedent, plays
things out accordingly to see whether its consequent is thereby made true. This procedure
results in hypothesizing a net being placed underneath Smith to prevent his jump from
killing him, which is why (2) comes out true on this backtracking interpretation.
The scenario described at the outset reveals three relevant observations about counter-
factuals:
5Counterfactuals about states include:
(i) a. If kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over.
b. If the proof had been valid, its premises would have entailed its conclusion.
6For now, I will set aside the ‘syntactically peculiar’ backward counterfactuals which contain an extra
‘have to’ (as noted by Lewis 1979a), such as:
(i) If Smith had jumped, there would have to have already been a net below him to catch him safely.
I return to discuss these backward counterfactuals in §5.1.
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A. Forward counterfactuals admit of two kinds of interpretations: backtracking and
non-backtracking.
B. The default interpretation of a forward counterfactual is non-backtracking.
C. Asserting a backward counterfactual will often make salient a backtracking interpre-
tation of a forward counterfactual sharing the same antecedent with, and uttered
after, that backward counterfactual.
(A) is well-known and confirmed by the fact that (1) seems to get a non-backtracking
interpretation in the original context, while (2) seems to get a backtracking interpretation
in the context of Beth’s speech. (B) and (C) are new observations. I discuss each in turn.
My evidence for (B) is that, in the context prior to Beth’s speech, the most natural
interpretation of (1) is non-backtracking—that is why it is most naturally interpreted as
true as uttered discourse initially. (B) is also illustrated by the fact that it is (or would be)
reasonable and appropriate for you to feel anxiety about Smith’s possible jump and relief
when Smith does not jump. Notice that, no matter how convincing Beth’s story, it is hard
to see how it could serve as an argument that your anxiety about the possibility of Smith’s
jumping and subsequent relief after Smith does not jump are inappropriate or otherwise
misguided. Despite the philosophical histrionics Beth pulls, I remain firmly convinced that
your relief that Smith did not jump is appropriate, and a reasonable explanation for this
is that (1) is true on its default reading, along with the fact that things would have been
worse off had Smith died.
Evidence for (C) is that, in setting up the context for her backtracking interpretation of
(2), Beth first utters a backward counterfactual (‘had Smith jumped, there would already
have been a net below him to catch him safely’). Furthermore, this is no quirk about Jack-
son’s example: in every major discussion of backtracking counterfactuals, a backtracking
interpretation is brought out in a context in which a similar contextual preamble is asserted,
followed by a relevant backward counterfactual, then followed by the target backtracking
forward counterfactual. Finally, both (B) and (C) have even been confirmed empirically.7
I conclude that any plausible theory of the meaning of counterfactuals ought to predict
these three observations about backtracking counterfactuals. However, no existing theory
of counterfactuals predicts all three observations. In the next section, I will discuss how
7See Gerstenberg et al. 2013. In their experiment, they set up as background a causal network as follows
(where A causes B and C, and B and C are individually sufficient to cause D):
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David Lewis’s favored ‘similarity theory’ of counterfactuals falls short in this respect, and
consider the prospects for augmenting the theory to make the right predictions.
2 What similarity lacks
David Lewis once considered adopting a historically structured theory, but rejected it,
thinking that its additional constraints rendered it unable to handle certain counterfactuals—
for instance those whose antecedents and consequents seemed not about any particular
times, as well as backward counterfactuals (cf. Lewis 1979a).8 Lewis ultimately adopted
a less constrained theory on which counterfactuals are about the most similar antecedent-
worlds to the evaluation world (see for example Lewis’s similarity theory—Lewis 1973a,b,
1979a—as well as Kratzer’s lumping semantics—Kratzer 1989, 2012).9 My goal in this
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The design of the experiment involved setting the actual values of A, B, C, and D to yes and varying
the order of counterfactual questions presented to participants (either starting with the target forward
counterfactual or starting with a related backward counterfactual):
(i) Condition 1:
a. Would D have occurred if B had not occurred?
b. Would C have occurred if B had not occurred?
c. Would A have occurred if B had not occurred?
(ii) Condition 2:
a. Would A have occurred if B had not occurred?
b. Would C have occurred if B had not occurred?
c. Would D have occurred if B had not occurred?
Ratings were on a -1 (no), 0 (unsure), 1 (yes) scale. They found that participants in Condition 1 were more
likely to say that D would have occurred if B had not (M = 0.5, SD = 0.82) than participants in Condition
2 (M = 0, SD = 0.88), t(78) = −2.64, p = .01, d = −0.6.
8We are setting aside counterfactuals apparently about no particular times in what follows here, but,
nonetheless, I think Lewis’s worries can be met. See Khoo 2015b for a defense of a historically structured
theory of counterfactuals against such generality challenges. We will see in §2 that backward counterfactuals
are no trouble for my historically structured theory.
9Another important class of theories are interventionist theories of counterfactuals (cf. Pearl 2000, Hid-
dleston 2005, Briggs 2012), which hold that counterfactuals are evaluated relative to causal networks.
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section is to provide some reasons for thinking that opting for the less constrained simi-
larity theory is the wrong move. In particular, I will argue that Lewis’s theory does not
predict (A)–(C), and furthermore that it is not obvious how to amend it so that it does.
Since Lewis himself explicitly set aside backtracking counterfactuals, any conclusions of
this section are speculative and not decisive. My goal here is just to illustrate the sort of
trouble (A)–(C) raise for a standard theory of counterfactuals in order to contrast it with
how my theory predicts (A)–(C).
I pause to briefly remark on my choice of terminology for the rest of this paper. Let c
be a variable over contexts and w be a variable over worlds. Uppercase italic letters like
‘A’ denote sentences, ‘A C’ denotes the English would-counterfactual with antecedent
A and consequent B, and ‘A C’ likewise for the English might-counterfactual. Serif
uppercase letters like ‘A’ denote propositions, which I will assume are sets of possible worlds
(i.e., subsets of the set of all worlds W). ‘A’ denotes the negation of A (set-theoretically,
W \ A), ‘A ∩ B’ denotes the conjunction (intersection) of A and C, and so on. Finally,
‘A |= B’ expresses that A entails B, that is, that every A-world is a B-world.
Following Lewis and many others, I will assume that counterfactuals are context-
dependent quantifiers over possible worlds. But, in a given context, what domain of worlds
do counterfactuals quantify over? Lewis’s proposal is that the domain of a counterfactual
A C is the set of A-worlds that are most similar (in context c) to w. This yields the
following semantics:
lewis:
A C is true at c, w iff all the most similarc A-worlds to w are C-worlds.
Until we know what the most similarc worlds are, for a given c, we do not have a predictive
theory of the truth conditions of counterfactuals in c. My challenge to lewis is to supply
an independently motivated account of the contextually supplied similarity relation that,
together with his semantics, predicts (A)–(C). Of course, I have no proof that a plausible
story here cannot be told on a similarity semantics. My aim in this section is to argue that
some reasonable things one might say in response to my challenge do not help. My aim in
the rest of the paper is to argue that opting for a historical modality theory does help.
However, although sophisticated interventionist theories like that of Hiddleston 2005 do predict (A), even
that theory fails to predict (B) and (C) (see especially §4 of Hiddleston 2005). I will not discuss interven-
tionist theories further at this time, except to note that my theory and the interventionist theory make
similar predictions about non-backtracking counterfactuals (albeit in slightly different ways); see §2.
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Lewis’s official semantics for non-backtracking interpretations of counterfactuals comes
in Lewis 1979a, where he explicitly sets aside backtracking interpretations to focus on the
former, noting that ‘only under the standard [non-backtracking] resolution do we have
a clear-cut asymmetry of counterfactual dependence that interests me’ (p. 458). Lewis
focuses on the following objection of Fine 1975 to his earlier proposal that measures worlds
by their overall similarity:
Nixon. It is 1975 and President Nixon has just learned that a certain unfriendly
country has acquired a nuclear bomb. Before him is the button connected to the
arming and firing of several nuclear warheads. He dismisses the idea, instead
opting for a strategy of peaceful disarmament.
In this situation, it seems true that:
(3) If Nixon had pressed the button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust.
However, since in fact there was no nuclear holocaust, it seems (by a very natural notion
of ‘similar’) that the most similar worlds in which Nixon presses the button are ones in
which no holocaust occurs. Thus, it seems that Lewis’s semantics ought to predict that
(3) is false—had Nixon pressed the button, the signal would have failed (or something else
interfered, preventing the holocaust).
Lewis’s response is that such pre-theoretic judgments of similarity are not responsible
for our truth conditions of counterfactuals. Rather, a four-part system of weights deter-
mines the similarity relation governing non-backtracking counterfactuals (p. 472):
weights
1. It is first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse violations of law.
2. It is of second importance to maximize the spatio-temporal region throughout which
perfect match of particular fact prevails.
3. It is of third importance to avoid even small, localized, simple violations of law.
4. It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular fact,
even in matters that concern us greatly.
Here is roughly what the analysis predicts for the non-backtracking interpretation of (1),
restricting our attention to the case in which the laws are deterministic.
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(1) If Smith had jumped, he would have died.
The actual world α is one in which Smith is fully rational, knows there is nothing beneath
him to catch him, thus does not jump, and thus does not die. Now, consider four classes
of worlds in which Smith jumps:
• w1 is exactly like α up until some time just before Smith’s jump, when some small
divergence in α’s laws occurs, leading to Smith jumping. At w1, no net is underneath
Smith and hence Smith dies from his jump.
• w2 contains no divergences from α’s laws. Thus, given the assumption that α’s laws
are deterministic, w2’s history is entirely different from α’s. w2-type worlds will
plausibly further subdivide into ones in which there is a net underneath Smith at his
jump and ones in which there is no net underneath Smith.
• w3 is exactly like α up until some time just before Smith’s jump, when some small
divergence in α’s laws occurs, leading to Smith’s jump. Then just after Smith jumps,
another divergence from α’s laws occurs, leading to an outcome similar, though not
perfectly similar, to that of α (in particular, Smith does not die, though Smith
remembers jumping and so on).
• w4 is exactly like w3 except that after Smith jumps a widespread and diverse diver-
gence in α’s laws that not only saves Smith but also removes all trace of Smith having
jumped, leading to an outcome exactly like that of α.
For lewis to predict our intuitions about the non-backtracking interpretation of (1)—in
particular, that it is true—it must be the case that w1 is more similar to α than either w2,
w3 or w4. weights is designed to predict exactly this fact.
10 Thus, according to weights,
the most similar worlds in which Smith jumps are like α for most of their history up until
Smith jumps; however, each contains a small miracle which leads to Smith deciding to
jump (contra his being fully rational, not wanting to die, and knowing there was no net
beneath him). Importantly, after this miracle leads to Smith jumping, no other miracle
makes a net appear beneath him, and as a result Smith dies from his jump and (1) is true.
10Furthermore, weights predicts this fact without building an asymmetry between past and future into
the similarity relation. This was an important result for Lewis, who was committed to grounding the
fact that the future depends asymmetrically on the past in the fact that future events asymmetrically
counterfactually depend on past events.
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Let us suppose for now that lewis + weights yields the right predictions regarding
the truth conditions of the class of non-backtracking counterfactuals.11 Can the theory be
extended to account for backtracking interpretations of counterfactuals? In the context of
Beth’s speech, on the backtracking interpretation of (2), all the worlds in its domain in
which Smith jumps are worlds in which a net had already been placed beneath him, and
hence are all worlds in which he survives the jump. Clearly, weights does not yield this
prediction. That is fine—Lewis never intended that it do so—but what kind of similarity
relation might yield this prediction?
One option is to hold that there are two relevant similarity relations: weights (given
above), and backtracking weights, which is identical to the former except in that it
ranks the importance of 4 above 3. Thus, according to backtracking weights, securing
approximate similarity of particular fact is more important than avoiding small, localized
violations of law. As such, by this metric, the most similar worlds in which Smith jumps
will be ones which lack any violation of α’s laws—therefore, given our assumption that
α’s laws are deterministic, these will all be worlds which differ from α in matters of fact
throughout all of their history. Therefore, this strategy yields ‘backtracking unlimited’
(Lewis 1979a, p. 171, Bennett 2003, pp. 206–207): the most similar worlds in which
Smith jumps will be those in which the entire history of the world is different in certain
ways. This clearly will not do for predicting the relevant backtracking interpretation of
(2). On that interpretation, (2) comes out true because a net is placed beneath Smith
prior to his jump, preventing it from killing him. But, given backtracking weights,
the most similar worlds in which Smith jumps will be ones with entirely different histories.
And we have no reason think that all such worlds will be ones in which Smith jumps and
lives (some may be worlds in which Smith grows up depressed and jumps because he is
suicidal, and so on). The lesson from this experiment is that backtracking interpretations
of counterfactuals seem to involve some backtracking, but not too much, and switching the
importance of 3 and 4 yields far too much backtracking. Hence, it cannot be what want.
An alternative strategy is to articulate the similarity metric for backtracking interpre-
tations not by modifying some of the principles in weights but in some other way.12 I am
11This assumption is itself highly controversial: see Tichy´ 1976, Slote 1978, Elga 2001, Tooley 2002, 2003,
Edgington 2004, Schaffer 2004b, Wasserman 2006. See also Kment 2006, 2014’s amended Lewisian theory,
which avoids some of these problems. However, though I am sympathetic to some of Kment’s ideas (see
in particular §3.1), his theory also fails to provide a unified account of backtracking and non-backtracking
counterfactuals.
12Jonathan Schaffer (personal communication) suggests the following general fix: bump all of the weights
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not sure exactly how such a theory will go, but let us suppose one succeeds in doing just
this. Still, we will only have a theory that predicts (A). It remains to be seen whether such
an emended discussion of the similarity metric will be able to predict (B), which would re-
quire explaining why one of the similarity metrics is default, and (C), which would require
explaining why uttering a backward counterfactual with the same antecedent as A C is
sufficient to make salient the non-default backtracking similarity metric. Again, though I
have no proof that such a theory cannot be plausibly motivated, I hope to have shown that
quite a bit of work remains for the similarity-theorist.13 At this point, I think we might
be better off exploring whether other, more constrained, theories fare better with respect
to (A)–(C). To that end, I turn now to articulating such an alternative theory, one which
embraces the historical structural constraints Lewis rejected from the outset.
3 Counterfactuals and histories
As a preliminary motivation for adopting a historically structured semantics for counter-
factuals, notice that counterfactuals like (1) are distinguished from their indicative cousins
(e.g., (4)) morphologically: the counterfactual contains an extra layer of past tense and
down one step and add a new weight on top: hold fixed the truth value of all the contextually sacrosanct
propositions. Then, given that in the initial context it is contextually sacrosanct that there is no net
underneath Smith, this must also be true at the most similar worlds at which Smith jumps—hence (1) is
predicted to be true in the initial context. Somehow, when Beth raises the possibility of Smith’s jump being
preceded by a net being placed underneath him, this makes that proposition not contextually sacrosanct,
and hence allows for the backtracking reading in which (2) comes out false. I think this is a promising
proposal, and I cannot fully address it here. However, I will mention three worries. The first is why, in
the null (or default) context in which (1) is evaluated, it is contextually sacrosanct that there is no net
beneath Smith. Is it because it is mentioned in the description of the case, or because it is visible to all of
the parties on the scene? Furthermore, since we know that at least one of the propositions asserted in that
preamble must not be held fixed in the evaluation of (1) (given that they are jointly incompatible with the
proposition that Smith jumps), unless we have some explanation why the proposition that there is nothing
beneath him is different from the others, the ‘contextual sacrosanctness’ view will not predict (B). Second,
I wonder whether and why the proposal that Beth’s utterance of the backward counterfactual ‘had Smith
jumped, there would have been a net underneath him’ is sufficient to override the contextual sacrosanctity
of there not being a net underneath Smith. Third, I wonder whether, once we have a notion of contextual
sacrosanctity in place, we even need Lewis’s other weights. If we do not, then this would not amount to an
amendment to Lewis but a wholesale replacement of the theory.
13Since she does not discuss backtracking counterfactuals, it is unclear what Kratzer’s lumping semantics
(Kratzer 1989, 2012) would say about (A)–(C). However, notice that what is needed to explain any of
these facts via lumping is some context-dependence in what lumps what, or the extent to which lumping
determines similarity. Furthermore, it is not obvious how to make either thought precise. Granted, a full
examination of the extent to which Kratzer’s lumping semantics may be able to explain (A)–(C) lies far
beyond this paper, and I will not be able to undertake such an investigation at this time.
10
the tense auxiliary ‘would’ in its consequent:14
(1) If Smith had jumped, he would have died.
(4) If Smith jumped, he died.
That the extra layer of past tense on (1) is not doing what past tense normally does is
illustrated by the fact that the past perfect ‘had’ felicitously combines with future-oriented
frame adverbials like ‘tomorrow’ in the antecedents of conditionals, but not outside of
them:15
(5) The contest was held today . . .
a. If you had entered tomorrow, you would have missed it.
b. Luckily for Sue, she had (already) entered the contest last night.
c. #Unfortunately for Smith, he had (already) entered the contest tomorrow.
The most straightforward hypothesis about what this extra layer of past tense is doing is
shifting the evaluation time of the counterfactual to the past (cf. Tedeschi 1981, Thomason
& Gupta 1980, Dudman 1983, 1984, 1988, Edgington 1995, Ippolito 2003, 2006, 2013b,
Arregui 2005b, 2007, 2009).16 Historically structured theories embrace this hypothesis,
holding that the past tense allows us to talk about alternate futures which are accessible
only from past branch points. I will say more about this in a moment, but we may state
the basic idea by appealing to a contextually supplied domain function, Dc, that maps
propositions, worlds, and times to sets of worlds:17
14The past perfect ‘had’ is normally used to mark that the event described takes place at a time to the
past of some reference time, which is itself to the past of speech time (cf. Reichenbach 1947). For instance:
(i) Yesterday, Sue had called the prospects before John got a chance to call them.
Also, it is generally accepted that ‘would’ is the past of ‘will’ (cf. Palmer 1986, Ogihara 1996, Abusch 1997,
1998), as in:
(ii) Yesterday, someone would shoot Kennedy.
15This feature of subjunctive conditionals has been called ‘forward time shift’ in the conditionals literature
(cf. Gibbard 1981, Dudman 1983, 1984, Edgington 1995, Bennett 2003).
16This hypothesis contrasts with one on which the past tense morphology has a ‘modal distancing’ effect,
indicating that the antecedent and consequent may reach beyond the set of worlds that might be actual given
what’s presupposed in the conversation (the main idea is due to Iatridou 2000, though see also Stalnaker
1975, Isard 1974, Lyons 1977, von Fintel 1997, Starr 2013, Schulz 2014).
17Throughout this paper, I will assume for the sake of simplicity that counterfactuals are context-
dependent variably strict quantifiers over possible worlds. This assumption is obviously controversial,
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semantics:
A C is true at c, w, t iff all worlds in Dc(A, w, t′) are C-worlds. (Where t′ is
before t)
To fix terminology, call the time that is input to the domain function D counterfactual
time (Bennett 2003 calls this the time of the fork, or branch).18 So, what is Dc(A, w, t)?
Given our above thought about accessing past-accessible futures, a plausible answer is that
Dc(A, w, t) is some subset of the historically possible A-worlds at w, t (cf. Thomason &
Gupta 1980, Thomason 1985, Tedeschi 1981, Ippolito 2003, 2006, Placek & Mu¨ller 2007,
Arregui 2007, 2009):
historical:
For any w, t: Dc(A, w, t) is a subset of the historically possible A-worlds at w, t.
We define the historically possible worlds relative to w at time t as follows:
Def 1. The historically possible worlds relative to world w at time t is the set
H(w, t) = {w′ : w′ is exactly intrinsically alike w at all times t′ ≤ t}.
The intuitive appeal of this approach is that historical possibilities are distinguished by
being asymmetrically structured with respect to time, so that what was once historically
possible may not now be historically possible, while everything that is now historically
possible was always historically possible. We can see this visually in the following diagram:
but, fortunately, nothing that I say in the paper turns on these assumptions. We could reformulate our
discussion within a strict semantics for counterfactuals, or even within a selection-function semantics in
which their truth depends on whether C holds at some particular A-world. For further discussion of such
assumptions, see Stalnaker 1968, 1980, Lewis 1973b, von Fintel 2001, Gillies 2007, Swanson 2011.
18There will often be differences between nearby times t and t′ that don’t matter to the truth value of
some counterfactual A C (holding other things fixed), and in such case a speaker may not intend her
utterance of A C to have as its counterfactual time t rather than t′. To ensure a common subject matter
for a conversation involving some counterfactuals, we should probably not make them about specific times
but rather intervals of time (indeed, if time is dense we have no other option anyway). To minimize the
complexity in stating the theory, I will ignore this complication in what follows.
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t1 t2 t3
• w1
• •

==
==
==
==
== • w2
• w3
Figure 1
At t1, w1, w2, and w3 are all historically accessible to w1, but at t3 only w1 is historically
accessible to w1. Supposing that counterfactuals are modals that quantify over historical
possibilities offers a plausible explanation for why counterfactuals are past-tensed and why
they contain ‘would’ in their consequents—the past tense allows them to quantify over past
historical possibilities that are no longer historically possible, and ‘would’ situates the time
of the consequent to the future of that past history-branch point.
Combining semantics + historical yields that A C is true at c, w, t iff every
world in a certain subset of the historically possible A-worlds at w, t′ is a C-world (where
t′ is before t). As it stands, this is just a schema for delivering the truth conditions of
counterfactuals—different ways of constraining counterfactual time t′ and selecting the
relevant subset of the historically possible A-worlds will yield different truth conditions.
Thus, the schema is a flexible one, which is good because flexibility seems to be what
is required to predict (A), (B), and (C). However, in order for this strategy to work,
we need to pair semantics with the right account of t′ and Dc. In the rest of this
section, I develop my favored historical-modality theory of counterfactuals, motivating
several additional constraints on t′ and Dc. In §4, I provide a pragmatic motivation for
an additional default constraint on t′ and then show how the resulting theory predicts
(A)–(C). Each of the constraints discussed are novel to my theory, distinguishing it from
other historical-modality theories of counterfactuals.19
19See for instance Jackson 1977, Tedeschi 1981, Thomason & Gupta 1980, Thomason 1985, Bennett 2003,
Ippolito 2003, 2006, 2013b, Arregui 2005b, 2007, 2009, Placek & Mu¨ller 2007. None of these authors discuss
what factors might set the relevant past counterfactual time. Arregui 2005a discusses backtracking coun-
terfactuals within the context of a historical-modality theory, but comes to very different conclusions from
mine. One problem with Arregui’s theory is that it is incomplete: her theory only extends to backtrack-
ing counterfactuals which contain an extra ‘have to’. But clearly there are backwards and backtracking
counterfactuals which do not contain the extra morphology (e.g., (2) and (9)).
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3.1 Additional constraints on the domain function Dc
Counterfactuals bear a close connection to causation and laws of nature.20 For instance, as
many theorists have noted, law-like and causal statements seem to support counterfactuals:
(6) a. It is a law that water is H2O.
b. If this substance had been water, it would have been H2O.
(7) a. John’s throwing the rock caused the window to break.
b. If John had not thrown the rock, the window would not have broken.
Furthermore, our intuitions about laws and causation seem to guide our intuitions about
counterfactuals. In Fine’s Nixon example (reprinted here), we intuitively seem to hold
fixed the actual laws in evaluating what happens after the button is pressed.
(3) If Nixon had pressed the button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust.
On such grounds, we might be persuaded to think that Dc(A, w, t) ought to entail all
the laws of nature of w. However, this quickly leads to strange results, if determinism
is true. Take an arbitrary counterfactual A C. Either its counterfactual time is the
first moment of w or not. Supposing its counterfactual time t is the first moment of w,
then A  C will have an extreme backtracking interpretation in which no facts of w
are held fixed (except those which are entailed by the laws and certain settings of the
initial conditions). Supposing its counterfactual time t is not the first moment of w, then if
Dc(A, w, t) entails all of w’s (deterministic) laws and A is false at w, then Dc(A, w, t) = ∅. It
thus follows that A C is trivially true. Therefore, if the laws of w are deterministic and
Dc(A, w, t) entails all of them, then either all counterfactuals with false antecedents have
extreme backtracking interpretations or are trivially true. This is an undesirable result.
I will not take a stand on determinism or indeterminism in this paper. Nonetheless,
I will draw a similar lesson to the one Lewis drew from examples like (3), though I will
implement this lesson in a slightly different way (the benefit of this approach will become
clear in a moment). Rather than appeal to laws of nature, I will appeal to the notion of
a proposition being causally sufficient for another (strictly speaking, it is the truth of one
proposition that is causally sufficient for the truth of the other; talking in the former way
is a convenient shorthand).21 Given the notion of causally sufficient, we then define the
20See for instance Goodman 1947, Chisholm 1955, Lewis 1986, 2000, Maudlin 2007, Lange 2009.
21I will not provide an analysis of what it is for a proposition to be causally sufficient for another. Here
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following useful terms:
Def 2. A ⊃ B is a causal sufficiency of w iff A is causally sufficient for B at w.
Def 3. A is uniquely causally sufficient for B at w iff A is causally sufficient for
B at w and no other proposition is causally sufficient for B at w.
Def 4. A ≡ B is a unique causal sufficiency of w iff A is uniquely causally sufficient
for B at w.
Let Sw be the set of all causal sufficiencies of w. Finally, let the interval of time a proposition
is about be the interval of time throughout which the event/state it describes takes place
(it need not be continuous). With this in hand, we define the function S which maps a
world w and time t to the subset of Sw about intervals of time entirely to the future of t:
Def 5. S(w, t) = {P ∈ Sw : P is about an interval of time that is entirely to the
future of t}
S(w, t) are thus the causal sufficiencies of w about times to the future of t. (Notice that, for
a causal sufficiency to be about times to the future of t, both its antecedent and consequent
must both be about times to the future of t.) From here, we add the following constraint
on counterfactual domains:
causal:
Dc(A, w, t) is a subset of
⋂
S(w, t).
causal has the effect of constraining Dc(A, w, t) to contain only worlds which make true
every causal sufficiency of w whose antecedent is about times to the future of t. As such,
causal ensures that (3) will come out true, assuming that its counterfactual time is some
time after the relevant background facts X are settled, but just prior to Nixon pushing the
button. To see why, recall that it is a feature of the case that pushing the button is causally
sufficient, given the background facts X and laws, for launching a nuclear missile. So, where
Pt is the proposition that Nixon pressed the button at t and Mt′ is the proposition that
the nuclear missiles are launched at t′, we have that (Pt ∧ X) ⊃ Mt′ is a causal sufficiency
is a (very) minimal constraint: if A is causally sufficient for B then either A is false or B is true. Of course,
we do not want the converse to hold, but my hope is that, once we see the role causal sufficiencies play in
the theory, we will find them understandable enough to tolerate taking them as primitive for now.
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of w.22 Suppose also that launching nuclear missiles is causally sufficient for there being
a nuclear holocaust. Then, given that (3)’s counterfactual time is some time t−1 < t at
which X is historically necessary but Pt is not, it follows that:
• Dc(Pt, w, t−1) |= X,Pt By historical
• Dc(Pt, w, t−1) |= (Pt ∧ X) ⊃ Mt′ By causal
Hence, every world in Dc(Pt, w, t
−1) will be one in which Mt′ is true, and hence one in
which a nuclear holocaust occurs; so (3) will be true. So far, so good.
Nonetheless, historical + causal is not a strong enough constraint on counterfactual
domains—it posits a massive break in the causal sufficiencies at counterfactual time, where
what we intuitively want is a small, local break. To get a sense of the problem, consider
the simple causal model from Gerstenberg et al. 2013:
B
>
>>
>>
>>
A
??       
>
>>
>>
>>
D
C
??       
t1 t2 t3
The model supplies us the following causal sufficiencies: A ≡ B,A ≡ C,B ⊃ D,C ⊃ D. Now,
consider the counterfactual ¬B D. Intuitively, on its non-backtracking interpretation,
¬B  D is non-trivially true. However, suppose that its counterfactual time is t1 (the
problem will also arise for earlier choices of counterfactual time; at later times, B will be
historically settled, and thus Dc(B, w, t) will be empty and hence ¬B D only trivially
true). It follows that:
• Dc(B, w, t1) |= A,B By historical
• Dc(B, w, t1) |= B ⊃ D,C ⊃ D By causal
22There is a slight fudge here, because strictly speaking what we need is the background facts to hold
at t, not at some time just prior. We ensure that if X holds then Xt holds as well by way of a hindsight
constraint (see below for details).
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But notice that, given just these two constraints, Dc(B, w, t1) does not entail C, and hence
does not entail D. Hence, we wrongly predict that ¬B D is false!
Here is why we predict the wrong result. Given just historical and causal, in
evaluating a counterfactual A C, we consider the class of A-worlds that each shares
the history of w up until t, and makes true all of w’s causal sufficiencies about times
extending beyond t. We thus allow for a break in the causal sufficiencies to make room for
the counterfactual’s antecedent (as Lewis did), but, incorrectly, we allow for too much of a
break. Intuitively, the counterfactual’s domain must also entail certain facts about times
later than its counterfactual time that are not disrupted by adding its antecedent to the
causal order. Luckily, there is a natural fix that achieves this result, and which also solves
an independent problem.
The thought behind the fix follows Jonathan Bennett’s ‘same causal chain’ proposal (see
Bennett 2003, pp. 234-237). The basic aim is to ensure that the counterfactual’s domain
entails every true and salient proposition about times extending beyond t that is caused
in the same way at historical antecedent-worlds as it is at w (when relating propositions
by ‘cause’ I mean ‘cause to be true’; I will use the simpler phrase throughout). Before we
implement the idea formally, let us see how it intuitively helps with the above problem.
Recall that historical and causal ensure that Dc(B, w, t1) |= A,B,B ⊃ D,C ⊃ D; but,
intuitively, we also want the counterfactual’s domain to entail C and hence (by closure)
D. On the proposal floated here, since C is a true and salient (by assumption) proposition
about times beyond t1, we check whether it has the same casual origin at historically
accessible B-worlds as it does at w. Intuitively, it does: at the historically accessible B-
worlds (at t1), C is caused by A, just as at w. Therefore, we restrict the counterfactual’s
domain so that Dc(B, w, t) |= C (and thus by closure, D).
To implement this idea a bit more carefully, we first define the historical/sufficiency
antecedent worlds at w, t as the set of antecedent-worlds that match w’s history up until
t, and make true all of w’s causal sufficiencies about times after t. Formally (suppressing
relativization to w):
Def 6. HSAt = A ∩H(w, t) ∩
⋂
S(w, t) The historical/sufficiency antecedent worlds
We state our third and final constraint on Dc as follows:
hindsight:
Dc(A, w, t) entails every true and salient proposition P about times extending beyond
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t for which HSAt ∩ P 6= ∅ ∧ ∀w′ ∈ HSAt ∩ P : P is caused in the same way at w′ as it is
at w.
hindsight formally implements Bennett’s proposal: the counterfactual’s domain entails
all the true and salient post-t propositions which are compatible with HSAt and which are
caused in the same way at those worlds as at w.
I turn now to argue that this fix is not ad hoc, but in fact allows the theory to handle a
well-known problem case in the literature. Consider the following situation (cf. Slote 1978,
Barker 1998, Bennett 2003, Edgington 2004, Schaffer 2004a, Noordhof 2005, Kaufmann
2005, Phillips 2007, 2011, Walters 2009, Won 2009, Ahmed 2010, 2011, Arregui 2009,
Ippolito 2013b,a): Joe pushes the button on an indeterministic coin-flipping machine which
initiates a coin flip; as Joe pushes the button, Sue bets that it will land heads; the coin
lands tails and Sue loses the bet. Intuitively, in this context (8-a) is true and (8-b) is false
(or at least not true):
(8) a. If Sue had bet on tails, she would have won. True
b. If Sue had pushed the button, the coin would have landed tails. False /
indeterminate
The difference between (8-a) and (8-b) seems to result from holding fixed that the coin
lands tails in evaluating (8-a) but not (8-b). hindsight allows my theory to do just this.
Let t be some time just before Sue does not bet on tails, BT be the proposition that Sue
bet on tails, and T be the proposition that the coin landed tails. Consider (8-a) first. By
historical and causal, HSBTt will contain only worlds just like w up until t at which
Sue bets on tails, and which are causally alike w after t. T is caused in the same way at
worlds in HSBTt as it is at w, at both such worlds, T is caused by Joe pushing the button.
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Thus, presuming for now that T is contextually salient, then by hindsight, Dc(BT, w, t)
will entail T and hence entail that Sue won.
Compare this result with (8-b), and let t′ now be some time just before Joe pushes
the button. Let PS be the proposition that Sue pushes the button. By historical and
causal, HSPSt′ will contain only worlds just like w up until t
′ at which Sue pushes the
button (instead of Joe), and which are causally alike w after t′. Now, notice that T is not
caused in the same way at worlds in HSPSt′ as it is at w: at w, T is caused by Joe pushing
23This is one of the payoffs of stating the semantics in terms of causal sufficiencies rather than laws: we
need not presume that every causal sufficiency is an instance of some deterministic law. Thus, we allow for
indeterministic causation, as seems to be the case in this coin flip example.
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the button, whereas at worlds in HSPSt′ , T is caused by Sue pushing the button. Therefore,
given that hindsight is our final constraint on counterfactual domains, Dc(PS, w, t
′) will
not entail T, and hence we predict that (8-b) is false.24 I conclude that hindsight is an
independently motivated constraint on counterfactual domains.
To sum up, the domain of a counterfactual A C at c, w, t is Dc(A, w, t). This is the
set of A-worlds that match the history of w up until some time t (counterfactual time),
match w’s causal sufficiencies thereafter, and entail all the c-salient post-t facts that are
not ‘disrupted’ by supposing A. We turn next to motivating some minimal constraints on
counterfactual time, t.
3.2 Minimal constraints on counterfactual time
What sort of minimal constraint might we motivate for counterfactual time? A plausible
candidate is:
Latest antecedent support: For any counterfactual A C, its counterfactual
time t is the latest past time such that Dc(A, w, t) 6= ∅.
Latest antecedent support states that the counterfactual time for any counterfactual
A C is the latest past time at which it has a nonempty domain. Combining Latest
antecedent support with historical, causal, and hindsight yields a semantics for
counterfactuals that is equivalent (as far as I can tell) to that endorsed by Jonathan Bennett
(see Bennett 2003, pp. 209–220). Call this theory jbat, which stands for Just Before
Antecedent Time:
jbat: A C is true at c, w, t iff all worlds in Dc(A, w, t′) are C-worlds.
(Where t′ is the latest time to the past of t such that Dc(A, w, t′) 6= ∅)
24The theory can also predict the falsity (or at least non-truth) of (i) in the scenario above:
(i) If Sue had pushed the button, she would have lost.
The proposition that Sue lost, L, is caused by the coin landing tails and Sue betting heads at w. But there
are L-worlds in HSPSt′ in which Sue bet tails and the coin landed heads. Hence, L is not caused in the same
way at w as it is at HSPSt′ . Furthermore, this holds even if we change the case slightly so that Sue makes
her bet before the coin is flipped, so that HSPSt′ |= BH. In that case, L still is not caused in the same way at
w as it is at worlds in HSPSt′ . At w, L is caused by Sue betting heads and Joe flipping the coin (causing it
to land tails). But at L-worlds in HSPSt′ , L is caused by Sue betting heads and Sue flipping the coin (causing
it to land tails).
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This is not a bad first pass at a semantics for counterfactuals. However, Latest an-
tecedent support suffers from at least two problems: (i) it cannot handle backward
counterfactuals, and (ii) it is unmotivated (as it stands). Focus on (i) for now. I will
argue that backward counterfactuals demand a looser minimal constraint on t. To see why,
consider the backward counterfactual that Beth utters:
(9) Had Smith jumped, there would have already been a net below him to catch him
safely.
Since in fact there was no net beneath Smith, the consequent of (9) is actually false. Let
J be the proposition that Smith jumped, and N be the proposition that there was a net
beneath him just prior. Therefore, presuming that the latest time t at which Dc(J, w, t) is
non-empty is after the time at which N is about,25 jbat predicts that (9) should be false,
simply because N is actually false. But this is wrong—the truth of (9) is not determined
entirely by whether its consequent is actually true or false. Rather, whether (9) is true or
false depends on what would have preceded Smith’s jump—and this fact is independent
of whether that event actually occurred. The problem here is with Latest antecedent
support, and can be seen clearly in the following diagram:
tN t2 tJ
J ___ w1
J ___ w2
N •
 
 
 
 
 
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





 J α
Figure 2
In the diagram, suppose t2 is the latest time for which Dc(J, α, t2) is non-empty. Then,
since N is actually false and about times before t2, it must be false at all historically
possible worlds at α, t2, and hence false at every world in Dc(J, α, t2). In such conditions,
jbat predicts (9) to be false. However, intuitively, the truth values of many backward
25I take it that this assumption is plausible for (9), though strictly speaking we just need it to be true
for at least some backward counterfactuals.
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counterfactuals (including (9)) are independent of the truth values of their consequents.
Hence, Latest antecedent support is too strict—it incorrectly predicts that the truth
values of such backward counterfactuals are determined entirely by the truth values of their
consequents.
3.2.1 Motivating two constraints
The most natural fix is to reject Latest antecedent support in favor of a looser minimal
constraint on counterfactual time which allows us to avoid predicting that A  C is
true/false merely because its consequent is true/false. I propose that following two minimal
constraints on counterfactual time:26
The default counterfactual time t for A C will be some time to the past of the
time of the context such that (if any):
Possible antecedent: Dc(A, w, t) 6= ∅.
Contingent consequent: H(w, t) ∩ A ∩ C 6= ∅ and H(w, t) ∩ A ∩ C 6= ∅
Possible antecedent says that the default counterfactual time for some counterfactual
A C is one at which its domain is non-empty. Contingent consequent says that this
time is one at which C is not settled by the history up until t, together with A (neither it
nor its negation are A-historically necessary). In the rest of this section, I will motivate
both constraints, and then show how they mark an improvement over Latest antecedent
support.27
26This proposal may face challenges from wild counterfactuals whose antecedents and consequents are
always historically impossible. I want to set aside these challenging counterfactuals for now. There are
several ways of handling them—extending the domain of counterfactuals to include impossible worlds, for
instance. See Khoo 2015b for more discussion of several strategies.
27I pause to emphasize that both are default constraints, and hence compatible with exceptions. For
instance, we sometimes use counterfactuals in stating reductio ad absurdum reasoning as applied to some
hypotheses under consideration. Thus, we have:
(i) A: If Smith had jumped, there would have been a net beneath him to catch him.
B: I agree, but it simply was not possible for there to have been a net beneath Smith to catch
him.
If you are like me, you might initially find B’s response somewhat strange. This is further support for
Contingent consequent. However, notice that we can make sense of what B is saying here. In effect, B
is trying to reason to the conclusion that Smith did not jump. My theory can predict this if supplemented
with a suitable semantic theory of metaphysical possibility modals. I will not defend any particular theory
21
Begin with Possible antecedent. It is plausible that ordinary speakers and hearers
aim to avoid saying, and interpret each other as having said, propositions which are triv-
ially true—such propositions are uninformative, and hence of no interest in conversations
where information exchange is an important goal. Indeed, this general tendency to avoid
trafficking in trivially true propositions seems to be why universal quantifiers invariably
carry presuppositions that their domains are nonempty (cf. Strawson 1952, Hart 1951).28
Here is an example involving nominal quantifiers:
(10) a. #Every living Civil War veteran attended last night’s gala.
b. #Did every living Civil War veteran attend last night’s gala?
c. #Not every living Civil War veteran attended last night’s gala.
Suppose the domain of the restricted nominal quantifier ‘everyφ’ is the set of things that are
φ. But the set of living Civil War veterans (the denotation of ‘living Civil War veteran’) is
empty since there are no such things. Thus, the domain of ‘every living Civil War veteran’
is empty. So if each sentence in (10) presupposes that its primary quantifier has a nonempty
domain, each sentence in (10) suffers from presupposition failure, which explains why these
sentences are infelicitous. Exactly the same behavior is exhibited by adverbial quantifiers:
(11) a. #Michael Jordan always brought cookies when he went to the moon.
b. #Did Michael Jordan always bring cookies when he went to the moon?
c. #Michael Jordan did not always bring cookies when he went to the moon.
Suppose the domain of the restricted adverbial quantifier ‘alwaysφ’ is the set of actual
situations that are φ (cf. Berman 1987, Kratzer 1989, von Fintel 2004). There are no
at this time, but consider the proposal of Williamson 2007:
(ii) 3A is true at c, w, t iff A⊥ is false at c, w, t.
Then, supposing each is evaluated relative to the same past time t, if A C and ¬3C are both true,
it follows that ¬3A is also true. (Proof: suppose A  C and ¬3C are both true at c, w, t. Then
Dc(A, w, t) ⊆ C and Dc(C, w, t) ⊆⊥. Thus, Dc(C, w, t) = ∅. Hence, HSCt = ∅; this follows because it cannot
be the case that Dc(C, w, t) is empty due to it entailing some post-t propositions incompatible with C,
since by hindsight any such propositions it entails must be compatible with C. Suppose for reductio that
Dc(A, w, t) 6= ∅. Then, since Dc(A, w, t) ⊆ C (by assumption), it must be that HSAt ∩ C 6= ∅. But we have
already seen that HSCt = ∅. So, Dc(A, w, t) = ∅. Thus Dc(A, w, t) ⊆⊥, and hence A⊥ is true at c, w, t.
And thus ¬3A is true at c, w, t.)
28I will remain neutral with respect to whether the sentence presupposes this, or whether speakers using
such sentences presuppose this, or whether both do and that there’s some explanation of the one in terms
of the other.
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actual situations in which Michael Jordan went to the moon. Thus, the domain of the
restricted quantifier ‘always ψ when Michael Jordan went to the moon’ is empty. So if
each sentence in (11) presupposes that its primary quantifier has a nonempty domain, each
sentence in (11) suffers from presupposition failure, which explains why these sentences are
infelicitous.
The presumption against triviality seems to be quite robust and general across universal
quantifiers of different types. Thus, there is every reason to suppose that there is a similar
presumption against triviality in modal expressions, such as counterfactuals. Next, given
our semantics, counterfactuals are equivalent to restricted universal quantifiers. Therefore,
we have every reason to expect that counterfactuals too will carry a presupposition that
their domains are nonempty:
existence: A C presupposes that Dc(A, w, t) 6= ∅.
Now, recall that, on my theory, the lexical domain of a counterfactual is determined by
an independent parameter of interpretation—counterfactual time. Thus, given the default
pressure to interpret sentences so that their presuppositions are met, we should expect that
the default interpretation of a counterfactual will be one on which its counterfactual time
ensures its domain is non-empty, and this is just Possible antecedent.
Turn next Contingent consequent. Suppose A C is interpreted as per the default
(and hence has a non-empty domain). Then, A C is true only if there are some C-worlds
in Dc(A, w, t) (where t is its counterfactual time), and this is so only if H(w, t)∩A∩C 6= ∅
(if C is false at w). Now, it seems plausible that considerations of charity will generally
motivate interpreting sentences (or utterances thereof) so they have some chance of being
true.29 Thus, we expect the default interpretation of A  C to be one in which its
counterfactual time allows some C-worlds in its domain (if there are any such times); to
fail to interpret A C in this way would be to interpret it in such a way that it has
no chance at being true. Admittedly, this is only evidence for one half of Contingent
consequent. What about its second conjunct, that H(w, t) ∩ A ∩ C 6= ∅?
One motivation for the second conjunct of Contingent consequent has to do with
counterfactuals with true consequents, such as:
(12) If Smith had jumped, there (still) would have been no net beneath him.
29This is a corollary of my principle truth, which I will discuss in more detail in §4.
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Although discussing the correct semantics for such ‘concessive’ counterfactuals goes beyond
the scope of this paper,30 it seems that such counterfactuals place the same restriction on
their counterfactual times as counterfactuals with false consequents—in particular, that
their counterfactual times are constrained to be prior to the historical settling of their
consequents. Without such a restriction—for instance, if we just had the first conjunct of
Contingent consequent, (12) could have any time as its counterfactual time. But if that
were so, combining this proposal with considerations of charity in speaker interpretation
(see §4.2 below) will yield a theory which predicts that (12) will automatically be judged
true (since there is an easy available interpretation on which it is true: just let its counter-
factual time be some time after which it is settled that there was no net beneath Smith).
Furthermore, this prediction will apply equally to any backward counterfactual with a true
consequent, resulting in the trivialization of all such counterfactuals. But intuitively not
all such counterfactuals are trivialized in this way. For instance, in certain contexts, (12)
is judged true. But in other contexts (such as after Beth’s preamble, as we saw at the
outset), it seems false and instead (9) seems true.
(9) Had Smith jumped, there would have already been a net below him to catch him
safely.
Thus, backward counterfactuals with true consequents are not automatically judged true.
The second conjunct of Contingent consequent allows us to avoid this consequence by
constraining counterfactual time to be some time before C is historically settled.31
Turn next to the upshot of these default constraints on counterfactual time for our
historical-modality theory. Suppose A and C are both false at w, as is the case with most
counterfactuals. By Possible antecedent, the default counterfactual time for A C
30For instance, the proper account will need to say something about the semantics of words like ‘even’
and ‘still’. See Bennett 1982, 2003, Barker 1991, 1994, Lycan 1991, 2001 for discussion.
31I pause to briefly note two other motivations for Contingent consequent. Khoo 2015b shows that
Contingent consequent follows from a principle that, together with a historical-modality theory of
counterfactuals, predicts the semantic difference between indicative and subjunctive conditionals like the
following:
(i) a. If Oswald did not shoot Kennedy, someone else did.
b. If Oswald had not shot Kennedy, someone else would have.
I will not be able to discuss this additional motivation for Contingent consequent in this paper for sake of
space. However, I do want to flag that we will see one other important benefit of Contingent consequent
in §4.2.2. Hence, at least within the context of my overall theory, Contingent consequent seems strongly
supported.
24
will be some time before the time A is about.32 This seems right: remember that, in
predicting the right truth values for the counterfactuals in the last section, I assumed that
their counterfactual times preceded the times their antecedents were about. For analogous
reasons, by Contingent consequent, the default counterfactual time for A C will be
some time before the time C is about. This is what allows for the possibility of backward
counterfactuals whose truth values are independent of their consequents’ truth values.
In the case illustrated by Figure 2, we suppose that t1 is the latest moment such that
H(w, t1)∩A∩N 6= ∅ and H(w, t1)∩A∩N 6= ∅. By Contingent consequent, counterfactual
time t must not come after t1. Supposing that its counterfactual time just is t1, then the
truth or falsity of a backward counterfactual (9) (J N) will not be settled by the truth
value of its consequent. For instance, Figure 3 reveals a scenario in which N is actually
false, but J N is actually true:
t1 tN tJ
N ___ J ___ w1
N ___ J ___ w2
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Figure 3
Thus, the two minimal constraints Possible antecedent and Contingent consequent
on counterfactual time are both independently motivated and allow for the possibility of
backward counterfactuals whose truth values are independent of their consequents’ truth
values. These two principles together comprise the default minimal constraints on the coun-
terfactual time of any counterfactual (forward, backward, backtracking, non-backtracking).
Say that a time t is a default admissible counterfactual time for A C in context c iff t
satisfies both Possible antecedent and Contingent consequent.
In the next section, I motivate two general pragmatic constraints on interpretation and
show how they affect the choice of counterfactual time. I then show how the resulting
32Suppose for reductio that t is some time after the time A is about. Then, given that A is false at w,
there are no historically possible A-worlds at t. Thus, by historical, Dc(A, w, t) = ∅. Hence, Possible
antecedent is violated.
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semantics predicts (A)–(C).
4 Backtracking and time
Recall (A)–(C):
A. Forward counterfactuals admit of two kinds of interpretations: backtracking and
non-backtracking.
B. The default interpretation of a forward counterfactual is non-backtracking.
C. Asserting a backward counterfactual will often make salient a backtracking interpre-
tation of a forward counterfactual sharing the same antecedent with, and uttered
after, that backward counterfactual.
My strategy is to explain (A)–(C) by showing how certain independently motivated prag-
matic principles of interpretation yield choices of counterfactual times that predict (A)–
(C). To get a sense of the strategy, consider the theory so far. On the theory, the truth
of A C depends on the history of w up until t, the causal sufficiencies of w after t,
and the post-t facts not disrupted by A. Earlier counterfactual times hold fixed less of w’s
past and more of its causal sufficiencies, while later counterfactual times hold fixed more
of w’s past and fewer causal sufficiencies. Hence, we can think of the choice of counter-
factual time t as trading off history for causal sufficiencies (opting for an earlier time) or
vice versa (opting for a later time), as bounded by our default admissibility constraints on
t, Contingent consequent and Possible antecedent. My strategy is to connect later
admissible counterfactual times to non-backtracking interpretations and earlier admissible
counterfactual times to backtracking interpretations. I will argue that there is a default
preference for later admissible counterfactual times, thus predicting (B); however, accept-
ing a (relevant) backward counterfactual can override this default and lead to an earlier
counterfactual time, thus resulting in a backtracking interpretation—hence predicting (C)
and thereby also (A).
Before we get into the theory, it will be helpful to have an idealized picture of the causal
situation described at the outset (Smith poised to jump on the roof of the twenty story
building):
26
Facts:
• B: Smith believed that jumping would kill him.
• D: Smith desired to live.
• R: Smith was rational.
• Nti : there was not net underneath Smith to break his fall at ti.
• K: Smith knew whether there was something beneath him to break his fall at t.
• J: Smith jumped at t′.
• L: Smith lived.
• S: If there is no net underneath Smith to break his fall and he knows whether there
is, he will believe that jumping will kill him.
(Nt ∧ K) ⊃ B
• L1: Anyone who is rational, has no wish to die, and believes φing will kill them, will
not φ.
(B ∧ D ∧ R) ⊃ J (Relevant instance)
• L2: Anyone jumping from a 20 story building with no net underneath them will die.
(J ∧ Nt′) ⊃ L (Relevant instance)
Given this idealization, we may represent the causal structure of the scenario in the fol-
lowing diagram, which represents the causal relations among different propositions at the
world of evaluation:33
33Of course, the time of Smith’s hypothetical jump is underspecified by (1). However, it may still be
constrained in certain contexts. For instance, supposing that Smith was on the roof from 1:00pm to 1:30pm,
then any hypothetical jump of Smith occurring in that interval would count as a relevant hypothetical jump.
More on how my theory can be extended to handle underspecified antecedents in §5.5.
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Here is how to read this diagram. Propositions in a box, like R , are true at the evaluation
world w. As before, a single arrow→ between two propositions signifies causal sufficiency—
so, for instance,
Z // K
encodes that Z ⊃ K is a causal sufficiency. A double arrow ⇒ signifies joint causal
sufficiency—so, for instance,
K +3 B
Nt1
;C       
encodes that (K ∧ Nt1) ⊃ B is a causal sufficiency. Finally, a squiggly arrow ; signifies a
‘masking condition’ such that,
J
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encodes that (J ∧ Nt4) ⊃ L is a causal sufficiency. I suppose that X,Y,Z, and W are (sup-
pressed) causal antecedents of R,D,K, and Nt1 respectively. Finally, I am taking liberties
with the times to keep things simple. There is very likely a large gap between t0 and t1
and a much smaller gap between t2 and t3.
4.1 Backtracking/non-backtracking and counterfactual time
The first order of business is to show how my theory predicts backtracking/non-backtracking
interpretations as arising from the choice of later/earlier counterfactual times. In §4.2, I
will argue that, by default, counterfactuals are interpreted as having later counterfactual
times, and hence by default have non-backtracking interpretations. In §4.3, I will discuss
how we can overrule this default and thus allow for backtracking interpretations.
Consider (1) again:
(1) If Smith had jumped, he would have died.
I show here why the choice of counterfactual time is crucial to whether (1) comes out
true on my semantics. Notice first of all that t0, t1, and t2 are all default admissible
counterfactual times for (1), but later times are not. I will show how my semantics pre-
dicts different interpretations of (1) depending on which counterfactual time it receives,
with later counterfactual times generating the (intuitively true) non-backtracking inter-
pretation, and earlier counterfactual times generating the (intuitively true) backtracking
interpretation of (2) (in the context of Beth’s speech).
First, let (1)’s counterfactual time be the latest default admissible time t2. Then
X,Y,Z,W,K,R,D,B, Nt1 , and Nt2 are all historically settled, and hence entailed by HS
J
t2 .
Furthermore, notice that Nt3 is caused in the same way at worlds in HS
J
t2 as it is at w,
being caused by Nt2 . Hence, supposing that it is salient that there is no net underneath
Smith at t3 (the time of his hypothetical jump), by hindsight, Dc(J, w, t2) |= Nt3 . By
causal, Dc(J, w, t2) |= (Nt3 ⊃ Nt4), (J ∧ Nt4) ⊃ L). Thus, by closure, Dc(J, w, t2) |= Nt4 , L.
Therefore, if (1) has t2 as its counterfactual time, my semantics predicts that it is true.
This is its non-backtracking interpretation, on my semantics.34
Next, suppose (1)’s counterfactual time is t0. Then X,Y,Z, and W are historically
settled and hence entailed by HSJt0 . Furthermore, each of R,D,K, and Nt1 are caused in the
34Crucially, the proposition that Smith lived, L, is not entailed by Dc(J, w, t2). This is because L is not
caused in the same way at L-worlds in HSJt2 as it is at w. At w, L is caused by Smith’s not jumping. At
L-worlds in HSJt2 , L is caused by Smith jumping and landing safely on a net.
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same way at the worlds in HSJt0 where they are true as at w. But then, given the causal
sufficiencies of w after t0, Dc(J, w, t0) will entail R,D,K, and Nt1 only if it is empty.
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Therefore, at least one of R,D,K, or Nt1 must not be salient in the context. Furthermore,
the choice of which to give up in evaluating the counterfactual affects whether (1) is true,
given t0 as its counterfactual time. The main point here is that if (1) receives t0 as its
counterfactual time, it has a backtracking interpretation on my theory—and depending on
which propositions are salient, on some backtracking interpretations it is false.
The point of this exercise is to illustrate how the choice of counterfactual time affects
the interpretation of a counterfactual on my semantics, which shows how my semantics can
predict (A). Before we get to the details of how my theory predicts (B) and (C), I want to
demonstrate (i) how my theory predicts the truth of (9), which is the counterfactual Beth
utters to set up her intended backtracking interpretation of (2), and (ii) how my theory
predicts the truth of (2), assuming that it receives the same counterfactual time as (9) and
is interpreted with respect to the same salient propositions:
‘Smith was rational, had no wish to die, could see below him, and knew that
jumping without a net would kill him. Therefore,
(9) Had Smith jumped, there would have already been a net below him to catch him
safely.
So,
(2) If Smith had jumped, he would have lived.’
(i) Predicting the truth of (9)
First off, notice that, by Contingent consequent, the default of interpretation of (9)
will be one on which it has t0 (or some earlier time) as its counterfactual time. Sec-
ond, notice that, in her preamble, Beth asserts R,D, and K. Very naturally, in do-
ing so, she makes each contextually salient (more on salience in §4.3). Therefore, since
it is not made salient by Beth’s speech, most naturally, Nt1 is not one of the salient
post-t facts. But, by hindsight, Dc(J, w, t0) |= R,D,K, and by causal, Dc(J, w, t0) |=
(K ∧ Nt1) ⊃ B, (R ∧ D ∧ B) ⊃ J,Nt1 ⊃ Nt4 . Therefore, by closure, Dc(J, w, t0) |= B,Nt1 ,Nt4 .
35Quick proof. Suppose that Dc(J, w, t0) |= R,D,K,Nt1 . By causal, Dc(J, w, t0) |=
(K ∧ Nt1) ⊃ B, (R ∧ D ∧ B) ⊃ J. Then, by closure Dc(J, w, t0) |= J, J.
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Thus, we predict the truth of (9) given t0 as its counterfactual time.
(ii) Predicting the truth of (2), assuming it and (9) are likewise interpreted
We assume that (2) has as its counterfactual time t0, the same as (9), and also that (2) is
interpreted with respect to the same salient propositions R,D,K. From (i), we know that
Dc(J, w, t0) |= Nt1 ,Nt4 . But then, given that the net is a safe one, an additional causal
sufficiency of w is (J ∧ Nt4) ⊃ L. Hence, by causal, Dc(J, w, t0) |= (J ∧ Nt4) ⊃ L, and thus
it follows that Dc(J, w, t0) |= L. Therefore, we predict that (2) is true, as long as it has the
same counterfactual time and is interpreted with respect to the same salient propositions
as (9).
Thus, my semantics is flexible enough to predict a true non-backtracking interpretation of
(1), and a true backtracking interpretation of (2). However, we have not yet seen why the
non-backtracking interpretation is the default, nor have we seen why (2) should have the
same counterfactual time and be interpreted with respect to the same salient propositions
as (9). I will address the first topic in §4.2, and explore the latter in §4.3.
Before we move on, I want to illustrate one interesting upshot of my strategy, which
is that it predicts that the backtracking/non-backtracking distinction is not a binary one.
Instead, it predicts that there are more or less backtracking interpretations, depending on
the relative lateness of the counterfactual’s time. This might seem surprising, given that we
started with a binary distinction, but a bit of reflection reveals that our starting examples
are really limiting cases of a more general phenomenon. Here is an example inspired by
Lewis 1973a:
(13) A: Smith was friends with everyone at the party. If he had gone, he would have
had fun!
B: But Smith would have gone only if Sue had too, and the only way Sue would
have gone is if it had been an 80s-themed party, and Smith hates 80s-themed
parties. So, if he had gone, he would not have had fun.
A: I grant that, but Smith would have known about the theme, and hence had
he gone, he would not have hated 80s themed parties. So, if he had gone, he
would have had fun.
Once we get to A’s second utterance of ‘if he had gone, he would have had fun’ it is
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clear that what A means by it is something very different from what A meant by her
first utterance of it, even though both are true! In evaluating A’s first counterfactual,
we suppose things are pretty much as they are except that Smith goes to the party. In
evaluating B’s counterfactual, we backtrack to make room for Smith going and this requires
supposing that it would also have been an 80s party. But then when we get to A’s second
counterfactual, we backtrack further, supposing that not only would it have been an 80s
party, but also that Smith would have (contrary to how he actually is) been someone who
liked 80s parties. Backtracking sometimes begets backtracking!
4.2 Default non-backtracking interpretations
Given the availability of these two interpretations, why are non-backtracking interpreta-
tions the default? With my semantics in hand, we can now reframe this question as follows:
why is there a default preference to interpret a counterfactual as having a later admissible
counterfactual time? In this section, I will offer an answer that makes crucial use of the
structure of historical modality. In broad strokes, my explanation goes as follows. First,
speaker intentions constrain the semantic values of context sensitive expressions in con-
text, in particular past tense morphemes. Second, pragmatic assumptions about speaker
intentions and relevant stereotypical background information often result in default in-
terpretations of such context sensitive expressions.36 By default here I mean that these
interpretations are innocent until proven guilty—these default interpretations are over-
ridable only if there is sufficient information in the context to override the background
assumptions that generate them. In the case of counterfactuals, the generalization about
speakers is that they intend to speak truly; the general background stereotype about coun-
terfactuals is that, since historical possibilities decrease over time and since counterfactuals
are universal quantifiers over subsets of such possibilities, interpreting a counterfactual as
having a later admissible counterfactual time will generally give it a better chance of being
true. Together, these assumptions yield a default preference to interpret counterfactuals
as having later admissible counterfactual times and hence as non-backtracking.
The first component of my argument for default later admissible counterfactual times
is the following hypothesis:37
36See Sperber & Wilson 1986, Wilson & Sperber 2012, Levinson 2000, Carston 2002 for related proposals
about how pragmatic assumptions may influence what is asserted by an utterance of some sentence.
37The assumption that speaker intentions are the only factor relevant to determining the value of context-
sensitive expressions is quite controversial (see for instance Lewis 1979b, Richard 2004, Glanzberg 2007,
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intention: Speaker intentions determine the value for non-automatic context sen-
sitive expressions in the context.
By non-automatic context sensitive expressions I mean expressions like demonstratives,
as well as gradable adjectives, epistemic modals, and conditionals (among many others).
These are expressions whose semantic value depends on context in a non-obvious way, in
contrast to ‘automatic’ indexicals like ‘I’ and ‘tomorrow’ for instance (cf. Perry 1997).
Following Kaplan 1989, it is widely agreed that the value for these non-automatic context
sensitive expressions in context depends at least in part on the intentions of the speaker.
I put forward intention as a reasonable first pass theory (modulo the complications
noted in footnote 37) about how we interpret context sensitive expressions. For instance,
if we setting up a party and you say:
(14) All the beer is in the fridge.
the most natural interpretation of what you said is that all the beer that we bought for the
party is in the fridge. This observation is nicely explained by intention. In this case, I will
assume that you intend to say something relevant about our current topic of conversation
(‘are we ready to party?’), and thus infer that you intend your claim to be about the beer
we bought for the party (and not, for instance, the beer that we did not buy, which is still
on the shelves in the store).
The second component of my argument is that there are general assumptions about
(a) speaker intentions and (b) relevant background information which (i) result in default
interpretations for certain context sensitive expressions that are (ii) overridable only if
there is sufficient information in the context to override the background assumptions that
generate them. I intend this proposal to be a rough first-pass theory of how overridable
default interpretations of context-sensitive expressions arise.38
Regarding (a), here are some examples of assumptions about speakers’ intentions:
truth: Generally, speakers intend to speak truthfully.
2015, Dowell 2012, 2013, King 2013b,a, 2014). For the sake of space and to keep the metasemantics as
simple as possible, I will not motivate this assumption but merely flag here that the final theory will
likely be more complex than the one I discuss below. Given that the metasemantics of context sensitive
expressions remains in theoretical infancy, I think this a reasonable move to make at this point.
38For instance, I will not defend this theory over competing relevance theories (Sperber & Wilson 1986,
Wilson & Sperber 2012, e.g.), which would do similar work by appealing entirely to considerations of
relevance. These alternative theories may be adapted to do the kind of explanatory work I aim for regarding
the default interpretations of counterfactuals.
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informativity: Generally, speakers intend to be maximally informative in what
they say.
relevance: Generally, speakers intend for what they say to be relevant to the topic
of the conversation.
These generalizations will hold for most speakers in most contexts, for the usual Gricean
reasons. As such, for any particular context, unless we have specific reason to think oth-
erwise, we tend to assume that the speaker intends to speak truthfully, informatively, and
relevantly.
Regarding (b) and (i), here are some examples of the kind of relevant background
information which seems to lead to default interpretations of past tense. Consider the
following contrast (cf. Taylor 2001, Wilson & Sperber 2012):
(15) a. I have not had breakfast.
b. I have not been to Paris.
Intuitively, by default, an utterance of (15-a) will be most naturally interpreted to mean
that the speaker has not had breakfast today, whereas for (15-b) that the speaker has never
been to Paris. These default interpretations are naturally explained by intention, the
general assumptions about speaker intentions (truth and informativity), and certain
default stereotypes.
Take (15-a). The claim that no breakfast-event occurred throughout some strictly larger
interval is more informative than the claim that no breakfast-event occurred throughout
the strictly smaller interval (since the former entails the latter). But the claim that no
breakfast-event occurred throughout the strictly larger interval is more likely to be false
than the claim that no breakfast-event occurred throughout the strictly smaller interval
(since it is a stronger claim). So, considerations of informativity weigh in favor of inter-
preting the claim as about a larger interval, and considerations of truthfulness weigh in
favor of interpretation the claim as about a smaller interval. Given our general assump-
tion that speaker intends to be both truthful and informative, what breaks the tie? Most
naturally, we also assume the general stereotype that people usually eat breakfast once per
day (and usually in the morning). Given this stereotype, we assume that it is likely false
that the speaker has not had breakfast in the past 48 hours (and so on for any larger past
interval)—thus, we rule out that the claim is about a past interval extending earlier than
today. As such, the interpretation of (15-a) that best weighs considerations of likely truth
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and informativity is that the speaker has not had breakfast today. Hence, since we expect
that the speaker to be truthful and informative, our default interpretation of her utterance
of (15-a) is that she has not had breakfast today.
Now consider (15-b). As before, the claim that no Paris-event occurred throughout
some strictly larger interval is more informative than the claim that no Paris-event oc-
curred throughout the strictly smaller interval, but the claim that no Paris-event occurred
throughout a strictly larger interval is more likely to be false than the claim that no Paris-
event occurred throughout the strictly smaller interval (since it is a stronger claim). In this
case, there is no general stereotype about when people (non-Parisians) usually go to Paris.
As such, there is no general reason to think that it is any more unlikely that a particular
person has never been to Paris than merely that she has not been to Paris today, or this
month, or this year. Thus, since to say that one has never been to Paris is more informative
than that one has not been to Paris this month (and so on), and since we expect that the
speaker intends to be truthful and informative, our default interpretation of her utterance
of (15-b) is that she has never been to Paris.39
Of course, these interpretations are mere defaults, and may be overridden. This brings
us to (ii): such default interpretations are overridable, but only if there is sufficient infor-
mation in the context to override the background assumptions that generate them. Let us
consider two scenarios:40
Scenario 1. It is Saturday at 11:15am. You and your roommates Sue and Ben
39Notice that if we remove the negations, the default interpretations remain:
(i) a. I have had breakfast. (Today)
b. I have been to Paris. (At least once in my life)
We predict this as well. Take (i-a). The claim that some breakfast-event occurred throughout some strictly
smaller interval is more informative than the claim that some breakfast-event occurred throughout the
strictly larger interval (again, since the former entails the latter). But the claim that some breakfast-
event occurred throughout the strictly smaller interval is more likely to be false than the claim that some
breakfast-event occurred throughout the strictly larger interval. So, considerations of informativity weigh in
favor of interpreting the claim as about a smaller interval, and considerations of truthfulness weigh in favor
of interpretation the claim as about a larger interval. As before, the general stereotype that people usually
eat breakfast once per day (and usually in the morning) helps break the tie, settling on an interpretation
in which (by default), an utterance of (i-a) says that the speaker has had breakfast this morning. I will
not also review how we predict a similar default interpretation of (i-b) but I think the reader has a sense
of how that should go.
40There are many other scenarios to consider. For instance, if you know the stereotype that people eat
breakfast once per day does not apply to Ben because he has a policy of only eating breakfast once per
week, then we predict (correctly) that when he utters ‘I have had breakfast’ in such a context, he says that
he has had breakfast this week.
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are deciding whether to eat at Breakfast Express or Lunch @ Sal’s. You and
Ben stayed up all night talking from midnight to now, and neither of you ate
anything during that time. So, you know that Ben has not had breakfast this
morning, and you know that Ben knows this too. Sue then says, ‘Ben has had
breakfast.’
Scenario 2. It is Saturday at 11:15am. You and your roommates Sue and
Ben are deciding whether to eat at Breakfast Express or Lunch @ Sal’s. You
and Ben stayed up all night talking from midnight to now, and neither of you
ate anything during that time. So, you know that Ben has not had breakfast
this morning, and you know that Ben knows this too. Ben then says, ‘I have
had breakfast.’
In Scenario 1, it seems to me that Sue says that Ben has had breakfast today, even though
this is false. In Scenario 2 it is unclear to me what Ben says: either he is saying that
he has had breakfast today and is lying, or maybe he is saying that he has had breakfast
this week, and is perhaps communicating that he does not want to eat breakfast more
than once per week. My response to Ben in this scenario would be, ‘Wait, you did not eat
anything this morning. What do you mean you have had breakfast?’
Notice that in Scenario 1, although you have good reason to think that ‘Ben has had
breakfast’ is false on its default interpretation, it has that interpretation as uttered by Sue
nonetheless. Thus, merely thinking that a sentence is false on its default interpretation is
not sufficient to override the default; after all, the speaker may simply be mistaken. This
is predicted by our proto-theory above: thinking that the sentence is false on its default
interpretation is consistent with the assumption that the speaker aims to speak truthfully,
and is not evidence that the subject does not conform to the relevant background stereotype
(in this case, that Ben eats breakfast once per day), so we predict that the sentence ought
to continue to have its default interpretation.
The crucial difference in Scenario 2 is that you know that Ben knows that he has not
had breakfast today. Knowing that the speaker knows that the default interpretation of
his sentence is false undermines interpreting that sentence by its default, if we continue to
assume that the speaker aims to speak truthfully. If we have good reason to continue to
assume that the speaker aims to be truthful, then we look for an alternative non-default
interpretation. However, since there is no obvious alternative interpretation, this leads us
to wonder what the speaker meant. Alternatively, we might interpret the sentence on its
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default interpretation and thus infer that the speaker is lying.41 Since the information in
the context does not settle which interpretive option is correct, we predict that this will
lead to ambivalence in how Ben is interpreted in Scenario 2.
Let us now turn to apply this proto-theory of default interpretations to counterfactuals.
We begin with the observation that historical possibilities decrease over time (recall Figure
1):
(16) For any world w and times t, t′ such that t < t′: the historical possibilities at w, t′
are a subset of the historical possibilities at w, t.
Furthermore, since for any A, w, t: Dc(A, w, t) is a subset of the historical possibilities of
w, t, this feature of historical possibilities supports the general heuristic that counterfactual
domains decrease over time:42
heuristic: Generally, if t < t′, then Dc(A, w, t′) ⊆ Dc(A, w, t)
Consider an utterance of some counterfactual A C, and suppose that you qua hearer
do not know, for any t, whether Dc(A, w, t) ⊆ C. Then, given heuristic, for any two
admissible counterfactual times t and t′ such that t < t′, you should think it more likely
that all worlds in Dc(A, w, t
′) are C-worlds than that all worlds in Dc(A, w, t) are C-worlds.
Hence, in such circumstances, you should think that an utterance of A C has a better
chance of being true if it has a later admissible counterfactual time than if it has an earlier
one.43 Given a historical-modality theory of counterfactuals like mine, this is the general
stereotype relevant for interpreting any counterfactual.
As such, we expect that truth + heuristic will generate pressure to interpret coun-
terfactuals as having later admissible times. But what about informativity and rel-
evance? relevance constrains the interpretation of certain counterfactuals to share
domains with others in the context—this is something we will come back to in §4.3. As
41Notice that even though you may suspend the assumption that Ben aims to speak truthfully in this
case, this does not undermine his sentence having its default interpretation. This is because other members
of the conversation (in this case, Sue) will continue to make that assumption and thus opt for the default
interpretation. This is an instance of the general fact that lying exploits the assumption of truthfulness
imparted to speakers; notice in particular that the speaker lying must assume that his interlocutors believe
him to be telling the truth, else his intention to deceive would be foreseeably frustrated.
42Indeed, the only case in which this heuristic fails is if just the right true propositions are salient in
the context in which the counterfactual is evaluated. Furthermore, knowing which ones must be salient is
extremely unlikely, which is why it will almost invariably be assumed that heuristic holds universally.
43This is so even if we assume a selection function semantics (a la Stalnaker), for the fewer possibilities in
the counterfactual’s domain, in principle the fewer opportunities to yield indeterminacy rather than truth.
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such, relevance will not play any role in predicting the default interpretation of counter-
factuals. Regarding informativity, my semantics predicts that there will be no general
relationship between the choice of counterfactual time and informativity. This is because
differences in the causal sufficiencies and salient post-counterfactual-time facts will yield
non-entailments in both directions of time (I demonstrate this in the Appendix). Since
we do not generally evaluate counterfactuals with full knowledge of the relevant causal
sufficiencies and salient post-t facts, it will generally be the case that for any times t < t′,
the interpretation of A C with counterfactual time t will not strictly entail (nor be
strictly entailed by) the interpretation of A C with counterfactual time t′. Therefore,
informativity will generally not constrain the interpretation of counterfactuals.
Hence, intentions, together with heuristic and our general expectations that the
speaker intends to speak truthfully (truth), be informative (informativity), and rele-
vant (relevance) generates the following default interpretation for counterfactuals:
Default: Generally and by default, the counterfactual time for A  C is some
admissible time t such that for any later admissible time t′, D(A, w, t) ⊆ C iff
D(A, w, t′) ⊆ C.
Notice that, once you reach some admissible time t such that the counterfactual’s truth does
not depend on whether its counterfactual time is t or any later admissible counterfactual
time, then intentions, heuristic, truth, informativity, and relevance provide no
additional default constraint on which time in that range is the counterfactual’s evaluation
time.44
44I pause to point out two important upshots of Default. The first is that Default is compatible with
time being dense and hence with the possibility that there are later and later admissible counterfactual times
without end. The second is that it predicts that by default many counterfactuals will be indeterminate,
since once we reach a late admissible time such that the counterfactual’s truth value is invariant as evaluated
with respect to it or any later admissible time, Default provides no further constraint on counterfactual
time. This yields the prediction that when we evaluate a non-backtracking counterfactual, there is a certain
degree of leniency in how much of the past we hold fixed. Take (3) for instance:
(3) If Nixon had pressed the button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust.
By default, we hold fixed much of the past in evaluating this counterfactual: in particular, we hold fixed
that the button is wired to the launching mechanism and so on. However, there remains quite a bit
of indeterminacy in just how much of the past we hold fixed in evaluating (3). For instance, it seems
indeterminate whether Nixon’s button-pressing event itself a miracle (thus holding fixed all of the past up
until that moment) or whether some small earlier miracle leads lawfully to Nixon’s pressing the button (thus
holding fixed less of the past). Such indeterminacy is correctly predicted by Default (cf. Lewis 1979a: 463,
Lewis 1981: 118). We will discuss backward counterfactuals whose consequents state miraculous events in
§4.2.2.
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Crucially, since later admissible times give rise to non-backtracking interpretations,
Default predicts that non-backtracking interpretations are the default. Thus, it predicts
(B): the default interpretation of a forward counterfactual is non-backtracking. Tying
things back to (1), we predict that it will be interpreted (by default) as having t2 as its
counterfactual time (from our diagram Figure 4)—that is, a time at which it is historically
settled that Smith was rational, wanted to live, and believed jumping would kill him, and
at which it is historically settled that there was no net underneath him right before his
jump. Hence, on its default interpretation, (1) has a later admissible counterfactual time,
and thus is true.
I pause to anticipate the following challenge. It may seem that my theory also predicts
that an utterance of (2) without any preamble (for instance, prior to Beth’s speech) should
also be interpreted so that it is true, for exactly the same reason as (1).
(2) If Smith had jumped, he would have lived.
Someone may reason like this: the speaker aims to speak truly (given truth), so she
cannot have intended that (2) have its default counterfactual time (since thus interpreted,
it would be false). Therefore, she must have intended some other, earlier counterfactual
time, and spoken truly. This is a terrible prediction: without the extra context provided
by Beth’s speech, (2) seems to have only the false non-backtracking interpretation; we do
not go looking for some backtracking interpretation on which it is true.
Contrary to the thought expressed in the previous paragraph, my theory does not
predict that we will automatically judge a context-initial utterance of (2) true. Recall
observation (ii): default interpretations are overridable, but only if there is sufficient in-
formation in the context to override the background assumptions that generate them. In
particular, knowing that S is false on its default interpretation is not sufficient to think that
it has a non-default interpretation. We saw this above with Scenario 1: merely knowing
that Ben had not had breakfast today is not sufficient to lead us to think that Sue’s utter-
ance of ‘Ben has had breakfast’ has a non-default interpretation. Likewise, merely knowing
(or thinking it likely) that (2) is false on its default interpretation is not sufficient to lead
us to think that it has a true non-default interpretation. In both cases, we assume that
the speaker, though aiming to speak truthfully, fails to do so.
Now, if we also have reason to think that Beth also knows that (2) is false on its default
interpretation, then my intuition changes. It is a bit tricky to set up a context in which
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this is clear, but here is one:
(17) Beth: I also agree that there was in fact nothing underneath Smith to break his
fall. Nonetheless, if he had jumped, he would have lived.
As in Scenario 2, I find such an utterance by Beth puzzling, and in this case I would try
to find a non-default interpretation of her utterance of (2). Since none are obvious, I might
ask for clarification about what Beth meant, prompting something like Beth’s backtracking
speech. The crucial point here is that my theory predicts that we will not interpret (2) as
having a non-default (backtracking) interpretation simply because we think it is false on
its default (non-backtracking) interpretation. It does predict that if we think the speaker
thinks (2) is false on its default interpretation, and if there is no salient intended non-
default interpretation, our reaction to the utterance will be one of unclarity rather than a
judgment of falsity. Both predictions seem to be accurate.
Before we move on to predicting (C), I want to address two remaining concerns with
my explanation of (B).
4.2.1 Might-counterfactuals?
My explanation of (B) is that, since counterfactuals are universal quantifiers (or choice
functions over a particular domain), smaller domains have a better chance of making
the counterfactual true; thus, since later times generally give rise to smaller domains (by
heuristic) and speakers generally intend to speak truthfully (truth), non-backtracking
interpretations are the default. However, might-counterfactuals seem to be most naturally
interpreted as existential quantifiers over the same domain, as follows:
(18) A C is true at c, w, t iff some world in Dc(A, w, t) is a C-world.
Thus, by the above reasoning, we expect the default interpretation of might-counterfactuals
to be backtracking, since we expect such interpretations to give them a better chance at be-
ing true. But, so the problem goes, might-counterfactuals do not have default backtracking
interpretations.45
In response, I accept that my view has this consequence for might-counterfactuals whose
truth conditions are given by (18); however, I want to mitigate the apparent badness of the
result by holding that might-counterfactuals are actually ambiguous between that reading
45Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this challenge.
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and one on which they rather express the epistemic possibility of the corresponding would-
counterfactual, 3(A C) (cf. Stalnaker 1980, DeRose 1999). Many of the arguments
for this view take a stand on issues that I prefer to remain neutral on (for instance the
Limit and Uniqueness Assumptions, and Conditional Excluded Middle). However, at least
one of Stalnaker’s arguments for the possibility of this reading carries over (see pp. 99-
100). If (18) gives the truth-conditions for every might-counterfactual and we adopt a
universal quantifier semantics for would-counterfactuals, then we should expect utterances
of sentences like If A, it might be that not-B, although I believe that if A then it would be that
B to be infelicitous. The reason is that, given these assumptions, the first counterfactual
should be equivalent to the negation of the second counterfactual, and thus utterances of
such sentences should be as infelicitous as utterances of sentences like, Not-A, although I
believe that A. However, utterances of sentences of the first kind are not always infelicitous:
(19) If Smith had jumped, he might have lived, although I believe that if Smith had
jumped, he would have died.
If we instead analyze the might-counterfactual here as involving epistemic might on top
of the corresponding would-counterfactual, then we predict that (19) should be just as
felicitous as an utterance of a sentence like, It might be that not-A, although I believe that
A. For instance, (19) should be as felicitous as (the switch to present tense is to force the
epistemic interpretation of might):
(20) Smith might be upstairs, although I believe he is outside.
Of course, the kind of reading I am positing for some might-counterfactuals raises tricky
issues in the compositional semantics of counterfactuals (see for instance Swanson 2011)
which I want to set aside for now. However, even granting me this point, one might rephrase
the worry as follows. Since I grant that there is an interpretation of might-counterfactuals
on which their truth conditions are given by (18), we can rephrase the challenge by targeting
exactly such a counterfactual. Consider the following example of Lewis, which seems to
clearly violate the epistemic might interpretation. Smith in fact has only dimes in his
pocket, but he does not know this and he says:
(21) If I had looked in my pocket just now, I might have found a penny.
Since for all Smith knew, if Smith had looked in my pocket, he would have found a penny
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is true, it seems the might-counterfactual ought to be true, on the wide-scope epistemic
might interpretation. But intuitively, (21) is false, merely because there was no penny in
Smith’s pocket. Let us accept this judgment for the time being (though see DeRose 1994
for dissent). This may be seen as a serious problem for my view, because according to my
view, (21) ought by default to have a backtracking interpretation, but it seems to have a
non-backtracking interpretation by default.
To this challenge, I respond that it is not so obvious that (21) does not have a default
backtracking interpretation, even one on which its counterfactual time is before it is histor-
ically settled that there are any pennies in Smith’s pocket. Remember that on my theory,
the counterfactual’s domain will entail any post-t salient facts not ‘disrupted’ by the sup-
position of the antecedent (via hindsight). Since looking in my pocket will not disrupt
the fact that there is no penny there (at least we are given no reason to think it would),
and since this fact is very clearly salient in the context, my theory predicts that it will be
entailed by (21)’s domain, even on such a backtracking interpretation, and hence it will
come out false even on that interpretation. Therefore, (21) may in fact have a backtracking
reading by default—our intuitions about its falsity do not tell one way or the other.
Of course, to defend against one alleged counterexample is not to provide any positive
reason to think my theory’s prediction here is correct. Thus, I close this section with a short,
and admittedly inconclusive, piece of data in favor of default backtracking interpretations
of might-counterfactuals. Consider the scenario described at the outset of the paper, with
Smith just seconds previously poised to jump. Beth says,
(22) If Smith had jumped, he might have lived.
Just prior to hearing Beth’s utterance, I am prepared to accept (1)—if Smith had jumped,
he would have died. However, my reaction to Beth’s utterance is not that it is obviously
false. Rather, I am quizzical. I want to know why she thinks that. If Beth says something
like, ‘Well, there are all sorts of reasons he might have jumped; maybe he would have
been wearing a parachute or maybe he would have had a net underneath him,’ this makes
it clear that she intended (22) on its non-epistemic interpretation (with truth conditions
given by (18)), and it seems most clear that it has a backtracking interpretation. If Beth
instead says something like, ‘Well, there are all kinds of things that might have happened,
so I do not know what would have happened,’ this makes it clear that she intended it
on its epistemic interpretation, with the embedded would-counterfactual having its default
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non-backtracking interpretation.
I conclude that there are viable responses available in defense of my theory regarding
might-counterfactuals.
4.2.2 Latest default admissible counterfactual time?
The final worry I will consider about my theory’s prediction of default non-backtracking
interpretations has to do with its prediction that the default counterfactual time is its
latest admissible counterfactual time (Default). The worry is that Default will force late
counterfactual times and hence lead my theory to false predictions about certain backward
counterfactuals. The following example from Bennett 2003 (pp. 209-10) illustrates the
problem:
Dam. A dam suddenly bursts, quickly submerging a low-lying road and killing
the people stuck in their cars in its path.
In Dam, the following counterfactual seems true:
(23) If there had been no cars on the road just then, no lives would have been lost.
However, in accepting this, we are clearly not thereby committed to the cars that were
actually on the road suddenly and miraculously ceasing to be there, just before whatever
time ‘then’ picks out. If that were so, accepting (23) would incorrectly commit us to a
counterfactual like the following being true:
(24) If there had been no cars on the road just then, they would have suddenly ceased
to be there.
(I pause to flag that Lewis 1979a’s theory is well-positioned to predict the truth of (23)
and falsity of (24) in Dam. According to Lewis, it would take a larger miracle (or set of
miracles) to make all the cars there to vanish just as the dam break than it would to make
each of the drivers of those cars to decide (at various earlier times) not to drive them onto
that road. As such, Lewis predicts that (23) may be true, though (24) is false.)
How, then, can my theory, which is committed to Default, predict that counterfactuals
like (24) are not true? I will argue here that, given Contingent consequent, the only
admissible counterfactual times for (24) are ones on which it is false. Begin by noticing
that the event described by the consequent of (24) is an event comprising at least two
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points of time: a time at which the cars are located on the road and a time immediately
after at which the cars are no longer on the road. Let E be the proposition that an event
of the cars on the road at t1 suddenly ceasing at t2 to be located on the road occurred
(Ct1 ∧ Ct2). Finally, let Ct2 be the proposition expressed by (24)’s antecedent—that there
are no cars on the road at t2.
Given Contingent consequent, my theory predicts that (24) must be false. Here is
why. By Contingent consequent, an admissible counterfactual time for (24) must be
some time t such that H(w, t) ∩ Ct2 ∩ E 6= ∅ and H(w, t) ∩ Ct2 ∩ E 6= ∅. However, at any
such time, (24) will be false! Quick proof:
The only admissible counterfactual times for (24) are before t1.
– Suppose (24)’s counterfactual time is t1, or any time after t1. Let t
+ be an
arbitrary such time. Then H(w, t+) ∩ Ct2 |= Ct1 , since Ct1 is true at w and
about times no later than t+ (by historical). Therefore, H(w, t+) ∩ Ct2 |= E
(remember, E = Ct1 ∧ Ct2). Hence H(w, t+) ∩ Ct2 ∩ E = ∅. Therefore, t+ is not
an admissible counterfactual time for (24).
– Suppose instead that counterfactual time is before t1. Let t
− be an arbitrary
such time. Then H(w, t−) ∩ Ct2 6|= Ct1 . Hence, H(w, t1) ∩ Ct2 ∩ E 6= ∅. But
equally, since H(w, t−) ∩ Ct2 6|= Ct1 , H(w, t1) ∩ Ct2 ∩ E 6= ∅. Thus, t− is an
admissible counterfactual time for (24).
But now for any time t < t1, if t is the counterfactual time for (24), it is false.
– To see why, first notice that Dc(Ct2 , w, t) |= (Ct1 ⊃ Ct2); this is because Ct1 ⊃ Ct2
is a causal sufficiency of w whose antecedent is about times extending beyond
t−. Therefore, since Dc(Ct2 , w, t) |= Ct2 , it follows via modus tollens that
Dc(Ct2 , w, t) |= Ct1 . But then Dc(Ct2 , w, t) |= E.
Now, my way of predicting (24) may seem to rely on a trick involving ‘ceasing to be’
denoting an event which has a temporal extension. In fact, it does not. Rather, it relies
on the fact that Contingent consequent drives counterfactual time to be earlier than
consequent time, and the fact that causal demands that counterfactual domains entail
causal sufficiencies with antecedents about times extending beyond counterfactual time.
Let us thus consider a related problematic example in which the counterfactual’s consequent
is about a momentary event or state, such as:
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(25) If there had been no cars on the road at t2, there would have been cars on the road
just before then at t1.
This seems false, just as (24). So how do predict this? Again, by Contingent conse-
quent, the counterfactual time for (25) must be before the time its consequent is about,
hence before t1.
46 Let us suppose (for the hardest case) it is the time just prior, t0. By
historical, Dc(Ct2 , w, t0) entails that the cars are on the road at t0, since they are on
the road at t0 at w. As before, by causal, Dc(Ct2 , w, t0) |= Ct1 ⊃ Ct2 . But of course
Dc(Ct2 , w, t0) |= Ct2 . Therefore, by modus tollens, Dc(Ct2 , w, t0) |= Ct1 . Hence, we predict
that (25) is false.
I conclude that Default is not threatened by examples like these—my theory predicts
correctly that such counterfactuals are false. However, I pause to briefly articulate one
upshot of this result. First, notice that (24)’s consequent is the negation of some causal
sufficiency of w, Ct1 ⊃ Ct2 . Therefore, just as my theory predicts that conditionals with
sufficiency-violating consequents must be false, it predicts that conditionals whose conse-
quents state true causal sufficiencies must be true. But now suppose that determinism is
true and that causal sufficiencies are instances of natural laws, and consider an arbitrary
counterfactual A C whose consequent is not about any causal sufficiency (for instance,
(23) above). Then, my theory predicts that this counterfactual’s domain Dc(A, w, t) will
contain worlds which violate some of w’s causal sufficiencies. Nonetheless, when we try
to state what such violations would have been using a backward counterfactual A M ,
by Contingent consequent, the domain of this counterfactual Dc(A, w, t
′) will comprise
only worlds which do not violate that sufficiency. Sufficiency-violations (or miracles, in
Lewis’s terminology) are thus predicted by my theory to be elusive.47 We know coun-
terfactual domains must comprise worlds where miracles occur by appreciating how the
semantics works, but we cannot use counterfactual language to state that they are there.
46As above, suppose (25)’s counterfactual time is any time t1 or later. Then H(w, t1) ∩ Ct2 |= Ct1 , since
Ct1 is true at w and about times no later than t1 (by historical). Therefore, H(w, t1) ∩ Ct2 ∩ Ct1 = ∅.
Therefore, any time t1 or later is not an admissible counterfactual time for (25).
47This is related to Lange 2000’s idea that miracles are ‘off stage’, though Lange is primarily interested in
preserving the intuition that laws survive counterfactual suppositions. I can see various ways of connecting
these two ideas, but I will not pursue this project at this time.
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4.3 How to backtrack
As I mentioned above, Default can be overridden in certain contexts, if there is sufficient
information in the context to determine which non-default interpretation the speaker in-
tends. In this section, I will sketch an account of one way Default may be overridden,
thus giving rise to backtracking interpretations. Since I aim to explain (C), I will focus on
how an assertion of a backward counterfactual is sufficient to override Default and bias a
backtracking interpretation of a related forward counterfactual.
C. Asserting a backward counterfactual will often make salient a backtracking interpre-
tation of a forward counterfactual sharing the same antecedent with, and uttered
after, that backward counterfactual.
Recall from §4.1 how my semantics predicts that the counterfactual (2) will receive a true
backtracking interpretation when uttered in the context of Beth’s speech and her prior
assertion of (9):
‘Smith was rational, had no wish to die, could see below him, and knew that
jumping without a net would kill him. Therefore,
(9) Had Smith jumped, there would have already been a net below him to catch him
safely.
So,
(2) If Smith had jumped, he would have lived.’
In particular, recall that we predict that (9) is true if its counterfactual time is some
late admissible time t at which (by Contingent consequent) its consequent is not J-
historically settled and its domain entails the salient post-t propositions that Smith was
rational, wanted to live, and knew whether there was a net beneath him. Furthermore,
we predict that (2) has a true backtracking interpretation if it has the same (in this case,
earlier than default) counterfactual time and its domain also entails the same salient post-t
propositions as (9). However, we have not yet seen why, in the context of Beth’s speech,
it should be the case that:
α. (9) is interpreted with respect to a set of salient propositions that includes that Smith
was rational, wanted to live, and knew whether there was a net beneath him, and
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β. (2) has the same counterfactual time as (9), and is interpreted with respect to a set
of salient propositions that also includes that Smith was rational, wanted to live, and
knew whether there was a net beneath him.
In the rest of this section, I will motivate (α) and (β).
(α): What are the salient propositions?
I do not have a fully general answer to the question of what post-t propositions will be con-
textually salient in a particular context, and I will not offer an account of what contextual
salience is. However, this should not dissuade us from appealing to a notion of salience
in stating our semantics (as I have done with hindsight). The reason is that we can say
enough about the intended notion of salience so that the resulting theory makes testable
predictions. For instance, it seems obvious that asserting a proposition is sufficient to raise
it to salience (at least for a short while). Notice that, with just this obvious thought in
hand, our theory makes several interesting (and by my intuitions, correct) predictions. For
instance, combining this observation with hindsight yields the prediction that (9) will
seem true given the preamble in A but not given the preamble in A′ (notice that the
preamble in A is Beth’s speech from earlier):
A. Smith was rational, had no wish to die, could see below him, and knew that jumping
without a net would kill him. Therefore, had Smith jumped, there would have
already been a net below him to catch him safely.
A′. There was nothing below Smith to break his fall in the event of a jump. Therefore,
??had Smith jumped, there would have already been a net below him to
catch him safely.
While (9) seems natural and acceptable in context A, it is decidedly less natural and ac-
ceptable in the context A′. Asserting that there was nothing below Smith to break his fall
makes it hard to hear a subsequent assertion of (9) as true; furthermore, an assertion of
this string of sentences is odd (perhaps because it is unclear why someone would deliber-
ately set themselves up to say something obviously false).48 The contrast between A and
A′ is evidence that whether we find a backward counterfactual acceptable (or felicitous)
48Indeed, notice that even just asserting that there was nothing below Smith in addition to the other
assertions in context A results in an odd string:
(i) Smith was rational, had no wish to die, could see below him, and knew that jumping without a
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sometimes depends on what is asserted before it in the context, and thus (assuming that
asserting a proposition makes it salient) confirmation of hindsight. Furthermore, this evi-
dence is not cherry-picked. As pointed out in the introduction, all the classic discussions of
backtracking counterfactuals involved examples in which the backtracking interpretation
was promoted by way of a contextual preamble, followed by the assertion of a relevant back-
ward counterfactual (cf. Downing 1959, Jackson 1977, Lewis 1979a, Bennett 1984, 2003).
Our observation about salience, plus hindsight, predicts the first half of this pattern (the
contextual preamble before the backward counterfactual)—the second half is predicted by
Contingent consequent (which ensures an earlier counterfactual time for the backward
counterfactual) and (β). We turn next to explaining (β).
(β): Why are counterfactual times and salient propositions inherited?
To begin, recall observation (ii): default interpretations are overridable only if there is
sufficient information in the context to determine which non-default interpretation the
speaker intends. My proposal is that uttering a backward counterfactual and then a forward
counterfactual with the same antecedent in close succession provides enough information
in the context for your addressees to work out that you intend the forward counterfactual
to share its counterfactual time with, and be evaluated with respect to, the same salient
propositions as the backward counterfactual. The reason doing so provides the requisite
information is that (i) it is generally assumed that the speaker intends her utterance to be
relevant (relevance), and (ii) the most natural way to interpret back-to-back utterances
of counterfactuals with the same antecedent as relevant is as sharing domains.
Here is an example of a similar phenomenon (that admits of a similar explanation)
exhibited by nominal quantifiers. Recall the example from before, where we are setting up
the party, and you say,
net would kill him. Furthermore, there was nothing below Smith to break his fall in the event of a
jump. Therefore, ??had Smith jumped, there would have already been a net below him
to catch him safely.
Interestingly, changing which propositions are asserted seems to bias us to favor alternative backward
counterfactuals (something also predicted by my theory). For instance, I find the following string perfectly
felicitous, and am inclined to accept the counterfactual as true as uttered in that context:
(ii) Smith was rational, could see there was no net beneath him, and knew that jumping without a net
would kill him. Therefore, had Smith jumped, he would have wanted to die.
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(14) All the beer is in the fridge.
As before, considerations of relevance naturally lead to interpreting you as meaning that
all the beer that we bought for the party is in the fridge. Suppose now that Sue follows
up, saying,
(26) Most of the beer is cold, but some is still warm.
Most naturally, Sue is talking about the same beer as you are—the beer that was bought
for the party. relevance also predicts this observation. For what Sue says to be relevant,
her claim should be about the same beer that John is talking about, since that beer is
now the topic of conversation. Assuming relevance, we think that Sue intends for her
utterance to be relevant and hence that she is talking about said beer.49
Now, on my theory, a counterfactual A  C is a claim about a domain of worlds
Dc(A, w, t), just as John’s utterance of (14) is about a domain of beer. So, just as a domain
of beer can be a topic of conversation, so should a domain of counterfactual possibilities
be a possible topic of conversation. Then, just as the relevance of Sue’s utterance of (26)
requires that it have the same domain as (14) (as uttered by John), the relevance of an
utterance of (2) immediately following an utterance of (9) requires that their domains be
the same. I now spell out the reasoning explicitly, using Beth’s utterance as an example.
Initially, you say (1):
(1) If Smith had jumped, he would have died.
This has its default interpretation, which is non-backtracking and hence true. However,
Beth counters by first asserting R,D, and K (hence raising them to salience) and then
uttering the backward counterfactual (9):
(9) Had Smith jumped, there would have already been a net below him to catch him
safely.
Since the default counterfactual time for (1) is t2, and this is not an admissible counterfac-
tual time for (9) (since t2 is after it is settled that there was no net below Smith prior to
his jumping), we cannot nontrivially interpret (9) as about the same time as (1). Instead,
we interpret (9) via Contingent consequent as about an earlier counterfactual time t0,
49I won’t speculate about the best formal theory for modeling these phenomena. For a now-classic theory
of how to represent the topics of a conversation, see Roberts 2012b,a.
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and true (given the facts of the case). However, now Beth utters (2):
(2) If Smith had jumped, he would have lived.
Now notice that, by uttering (9), Beth makes clear a candidate non-default counterfactual
time for (2). Assuming relevance, we naturally think that Beth’s utterance of (2) is
relevant, and hence about the same domain as (9) (since that’s the only way in this context
we can make sense of its being relevant). But since the salient propositions have not
changed, the only way for the domain of these two counterfactuals to be the same is if they
have same counterfactual time and are interpreted with respect to the same set of salient
propositions. Thus, since t0 is an admissible counterfactual time for (2), we interpret it as
having that counterfactual time in this context, and also interpret it with respect to the
same salient propositions as (9) (R,D,K, all of which by hindsight will be entailed by
Dc(J, w, t0))—thus, we interpret (2) as true! Importantly, the utterance of (9) immediately
prior to (2) is what allows Beth to make explicit the counterfactual time she intends for
the latter, and hence why Default may be overridden in this case.50
50I remain neutral about other ways Default may be overridden to yield a backtracking interpretation
of A C. However, my theory suggests that if there is enough information in the context to work out
the speaker’s intended non-default counterfactual time, and reason to think that the counterfactual is true
so-interpreted, this ought to be enough to ensure the counterfactual has a backtracking interpretation (this
is just a suggestion, because there may be other constraints on backtracking interpretations we have not
explored). Hence, my theory is compatible with counterfactuals having backtracking interpretations even
without a previous utterance of a backward counterfactual sharing the same antecedent. A casual reflection
on simple examples like the Gerstenberg model suggests that this is correct.
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Suppose that we both know the causal model. I then say to you:
(i) If B had not happened, then D would not have happened either.
I submit that it is not too difficult to interpret (i) as backtracking and hence true. If I emphasize the
lawful connections between A, B, C, and D, this also seems to help such an interpretation (as reported by
several colleagues). My theory predicts this. We both know the causal model. Thus, we both know that
(i) is obviously false on its default interpretation. Furthermore, it is easy to work out what my intended
counterfactual time for (i) must be (some time before A). On that interpretation, we both know that (i) is
true. Therefore, given truth, my theory predicts that such a backtracking interpretation of (i) ought to
be available and preferred.
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That is my official line about how my theory predicts (C). We predict the possibility of
backtracking counterfactuals because in certain contexts there will be enough information
to work out the speaker’s intended non-default counterfactual time. Furthermore, utter-
ances of backward counterfactuals are a way of making explicit your intended non-default
counterfactual time, hence (C).
Recap
Let us briefly recap the theory. I include the following graphic to show the building blocks
of the theory and what is explaining what:
The two general features sufficient for accepting a counterfactual A C on its backtrack-
ing interpretation are:
• Enough information to work out the speaker’s intended non-default counterfactual
time t.
• Some reason to think that every world in Dc(A, w, t) is a C-world
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Consider again Jackson’s example from the outset of the paper. The default interpretation
of (1) comes out true because on its default counterfactual time t, every world in Dc(J, w, t)
is a world where there is no net beneath Smith when he lands and hence one in which his
jump kills him. However, Beth’s speech, plus her utterance of the backward counterfactual
(9), induce two contextual shifts. The first is that the propositions R,D, and K become
salient. The second is that Beth makes clear her intended non-default counterfactual time
for (2) is some earlier time t∗, which she does by uttering it immediately after uttering
(9). Thus, if Beth’s assertion of (9) is accepted, it becomes accepted that every world in
Dc(J, w, t
∗) is ones in which there is a net beneath Smith at the time he lands, and hence
one in which the jump does not kill him. Thus, once (9) is accepted, as long as relevance-
considerations pressure us to interpret (2) as uttered by Beth just after as having the same
domain as (9), it will also be accepted, so-interpreted.
5 Objections and replies
5.1 Special backward morphology?
Objection: You have focused on backward counterfactuals, like (9), with normal counter-
factual morphology. But some, such as (27), involve an extra ‘have to’ in their consequents.
What is the difference, if any, between these backward counterfactuals, and can your theory
predict this?
(9) Had Smith jumped, there would have already been a net below him to catch him
safely.
(27) Had Smith jumped, there would have to have already been a net below him to
catch him safely.
Reply: I am not sure what the correct descriptive generalization about (9) and (27) is, let
alone what best explains it. Nonetheless, there are good reasons to think that my theory
is compatible with this data. Here is some reason to think that (27) is related to (9) in
the way that strong necessity modal claims (‘You have to wash your hands’) are related to
weak necessity modal claims (‘You ought to wash your hands’):
Bet. John is betting on horse races. The way the payout works is that those
betting on the top three horses win a percentage on top of their bet. John in
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fact bet on Slowmo, and Slowmo lost badly. Dasher, Dancer, and Prancer won.
Right before the bet, John was torn between betting on Slowmo or betting on
Dasher, but went with Slowmo at the last second.
In this scenario, I think that (28) is true but (29) is false:
(28) If John had won, he would have bet on Dasher.
(29) If John had won, he would have to have bet on Dasher.
In particular, I would describe the scenario as follows:
(30) If John had won, he would have bet on Dasher, but it’s not the case that if he had
won, he would have to have bet on Dasher.
This pattern seems analogous to me to the (deontic) ‘You ought to wash your hands,
although you do not have to.’ That is, it is often possible to coherently assert a weak
necessity modal claim conjoined with the negation of its strong necessity counterpart.
Explaining this fact about weak and strong necessity modals, and thus explaining what
is going on with the extra ‘have to’ in (27), takes us far beyond the scope of this paper.
But there is a promising proposal, due to von Fintel & Iatridou 2008, that can be easily
adapted to my theory of counterfactuals. Their proposal is that ‘ought’ and ‘have to’ are
both universal quantifiers, and that ‘ought’ quantifies over a subset of the possibilities that
‘have to’ does. Similarly, I could hold that the domain of ordinary backward counterfactuals
is a subset of the domain of those with the extra ‘have to’. Granted, more work remains
for predicting such a result within my theory, but there is no reason to think that such an
extension of my theory is impossible.51
5.2 Generality
Objection: There are examples which suggest that the backtracking/non-backtracking split
is a phenomenon which has nothing to do with time. Since your theory only captures tem-
51Some people report that (27) sounds ‘epistemic’ in a way that (9) does not. That may be right, though
my intuitions are not so clear. If it is right, this lends support to an alternative proposal to the one floated
here, one which is equally compatible with my theory of counterfactuals. On this proposal, the extra ‘have
to’ is an epistemic necessity modal which scopes above the counterfactual: 2(A C). (29) thus means
something like: it must be the case that if John had won, he would have bet on Dasher. This is false because
it is epistemically possible that if John had won, he would have bet on Dancer. For more on counterfactuals
with underspecified antecedents, see §5.5.
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poral examples, it does not account for the general phenomena.
Here is the example:52 suppose Jesus walks by Miriam cooly. Then I say,
(31) If Jesus had pushed Miriam just then, he would have done something morally
wrong.
You object, saying, ‘Look, had Jesus pushed Miriam just then, the moral laws would have
been different than they are (since Jesus is by definition morally perfect), so
(32) If Jesus had pushed Miriam just then, he would not have done anything morally
wrong.’
(31) and (32) do not seem to differ in their counterfactual time, and even if they did, it
is hard to see how that could be relevant, since what is morally wrong does not change
across time. Yet, (31) is intuitively true, while (32) is intuitively true in the context of
the objection (after the backward counterfactual has been asserted). Furthermore, the
example seems analogous to (1)/(2) from the introduction. (32) seems true because when
one ‘backtracks’ to make its antecedent is true, one has to change the moral laws such that
Jesus pushing Miriam is not morally wrong.
Reply: Here are two responses. The first is to deny that the moral laws are contingent,
and hence reject the intuition that both (31)/(32) are true in their respective contexts.53
I take it that this response is reasonable, but does not quite cut to the heart of the
matter. The second response is to accept the intuitions, but respond that although (31)
and (32) do not seem to differ in counterfactual time, they in fact do. But then what
counterfactual time might (32) have, in light of the assumption that what is morally wrong
does not change across time? One possibility is to secure moral contingency by considering
alternative branches from some initial moment of time. On this response, (32) has as its
counterfactual time the initial moment of time (or at least some very early moment), at
which it is historically contingent what the moral laws are. This picture is consistent with
the moral laws being eternal in the sense that, once it is historically settled what the moral
laws are, it is forever historically settled what the moral laws are. I submit that this way
52I owe this example to Tom Dougherty (personal communication).
53Though see Rosen 2014 for reasons to take seriously the idea that the fundamental moral laws are
contingent.
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of handling (31)/(32), although admittedly surprising, is not obviously false.
5.3 Disagreement
Objection: According to the theory presented here, the content of a non-backtracking in-
terpretation of A C and a backtracking interpretation of A ¬C do not contradict
each other. Hence, the theory predicts no disagreement between you (asserting (1)) and
Beth (asserting (2) after her preamble). Yet, intuitively the two of you do disagree. For
instance, Beth can appropriately say ‘no’ in response to your utterance.54
Reply: I want to first point out that I have tried to avoid taking a stand in this paper
on how the abstract truth conditions I assign to counterfactuals are related to their se-
mantic (or assertoric) contents in context. One approach would be to let backtracking and
non-backtracking interpretations of the same counterfactual express distinct propositions.
This implementation would predict that you and Beth may both assert true propositions.
However, an alternative approach would be to let the time and salient proposition param-
eters of a counterfactual be features of the index of evaluation (as in a two-dimensional
Kaplanian framework) that are initialized by a context of assessment (as in Lasersohn 2005,
MacFarlane 2014). That implementation would predict that the propositions asserted by
you and Beth are such that, relative to any context of assessment, at least one of them must
be false. I officially want to take no stand on this issue in this paper. However, in what
follows, I offer some reason to think that disputes involving backtracking/non-backtracking
interpretations are more complicated than the objection above lets on.
Consider again the scenario from the outset: Smith is poised to jumped on the top of
a 20 story building with no net beneath him. Now compare the following two discourses:
(33) Discourse 1
a. Avon: If Smith had jumped, he would have died.
b. Beth: No. Smith was rational, had no wish to die, could see below him,
and knew that jumping without a net would kill him. Therefore, had Smith
jumped, there would already have been a net below him to catch him safely.
Hence, if Smith had jumped, he would have lived.
(34) Discourse 2:
54Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this concern.
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a. Joe: If Smith had jumped, he would have died.
b. Sue: No. If Smith had jumped, he would have lived, since he would have
landed in the net beneath him.
There are several intuitive differences between these discourses. For instance, Joe could
appropriately correct Sue by saying ‘But there was no net beneath him’ and it seems Sue
ought to retract her claim in light of learning that fact. On the other hand, although Avon
could attempt to change the context back to favoring a non-backtracking interpretation
of (1) by emphasizing that there was no net beneath Smith, in light of learning this fact
(which Beth presumably already knows), Beth would not thereby have to retract her claim.
Another intuitive difference is that Joe and Sue seem to be disagreeing over a common
subject matter (what would have happened if Smith had jumped), whereas Avon and Beth
are not. Granted, the subject matter of Avon and Beth’s disagreement is not obvious, but
this is still a difference between the discourses. Finally, it seems correct to say that Avon
and Beth are merely talking past one another, and in particular that both may speak truly.
By contrast, the intuition regarding Joe and Sue is that one of their claims must be false.
These intuitions favor handling backtracking/non-backtracking interpretations of coun-
terfactuals as expressing distinct propositions. But then what about the intuition that in
both cases denial (saying ‘No’) is linguistically appropriate? This is unlike paradigmatic
cases of ‘talking past’ involving automatic indexicals, as in the following example from
Lasersohn 2005, p. 647:
(35) a. Kara: I am a doctor.
b. Tim: #No, I am not a doctor.
c. Tom: No, you are not a doctor.
We might be tempted to generalize from this example that, in discourses licensing denial,
the two parties genuinely disagree in the sense of making claims about a common subject
matter, one of which must be false. After all, this is what is lacking in Kara/Tim’s discourse
that is not lacking in Kara/Tom’s. If this generalization were correct, then the difference
between backtracking/non-backtracking interpretations should not result in those different
interpretations expressing distinct propositions. However, this generalization is mistaken.
Consider cases like the following (cf. Horn 1985, Sundell 2011):
(36) A: Smith ate some of the cookies.
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B: No, Smith ate all of the cookies.
(37) A: Burgers come with chips.
B: No they come with french fries.
Denial is licensed in both of these examples but in neither is it the case that at least one
of the claims must be false. Therefore, there is room to think that denials are sometimes
(though not always, as exhibited by Kara/Tim) licensed in exchanges where the two parties
assert compatible propositions. Exactly what conditions must be in place for this to happen
is a topic that goes far beyond this paper.55
5.4 Backtracking indicatives?
Objection: There seem to be backtracking indicatives. This is a problem for your view
because it predicts that backtracking interpretations arise only when a conditional has an
earlier than default conditional time, and this is implausible for indicative conditionals
since they are not past tensed.
An alleged example of a backtracking interpretation of an indicative conditional comes
from Gibbard’s ‘Sly Pete’ case (cf. Gibbard 1981, Bennett 2003, DeRose 2010). Here is a
version of that case:
Poker Sly Pete is playing poker against Mr. Stone. Pete has two associates helping
him cheat. Zack sees Stone’s hand and signals its contents to Pete, and receives Pete’s
sign that he got the message. Jack sees both hands and sees that Pete has the losing
hand. Before Pete makes his move, Stone gets suspicious and removes everyone else
from the room.
After the hand is played, but before the results revealed, it seems that Zack will accept
and Jack will reject (respectively):
(38) If Pete called, he won.
It seems plausible that there are two distinct interpretations of (38): one on which it is
true (Zack’s interpretation, P →Z W) and one on which it is false (Jack’s interpretation,
55For some concrete proposals about this issue, see Sundell 2011, Plunkett & Sundell 2013, Khoo 2015a.
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P →J W).56 Jack’s interpretation, P →J W, is false because its domain entails that Pete
had the losing hand (though it does not entail that Pete called iff he had the winning
hand). Zack’s interpretation, P→Z W, is true because its domain entails that Pete called
iff he had the winning hand (though it does not entail that Pete had the losing hand). As
such, Zack’s interpretation is similar in many respects to a backtracking interpretation of
a counterfactual. He reasons as follows: if Pete called, then he had to have had the better
hand (since he knew both hands and wanted to win), and so he won. Thus, it seems there
are backtracking interpretations of indicatives.
Reply: I am happy to grant that Jack and Zack entertain distinct interpretations of (38),
and I am also happy to grant that Zack’s interpretation bears many of the features of
backtracking interpretations of counterfactuals. However, there is still an important dif-
ference between the context-dependence exhibited by the indicative (38) and the context-
dependence exhibited by the counterfactual (2), which suggests that we ought to embrace
different accounts for each. (2) is by default non-backtracking, though this interpretation
may be overruled by asserting and accepting some relevant backward counterfactual. By
contrast, (38) is not by default interpreted as ‘non-backtracking’ (the interpretation of it
that Jack rejects).57 Rather, it seems that anyone in Zack’s epistemic situation should
interpret (38) on its ‘backtracking’ interpretation and thus accept it, even in the absence of
some extra contextual preamble (and likewise for Jack and the ‘non-backtracking’ interpre-
tation of (38)). Thus, unlike (2), the two interpretations of (38) brought out by Zack and
Jack’s epistemic situations seem to be on a par. Thus, the analog of (B) does not seem to
hold for ‘backtracking’ interpretations of indicatives. Since (B) is explained by my theory’s
appeal to historical modality and since it is compatible with my theory that indicatives
do not quantify over historically possible worlds, this feature of indicative ‘backtrackers’ is
compatible with my theory.
One way of accounting for this difference between (2) and (38) is to adopt the theory I
propose about the former and then adopt a theory of the latter on which it is an epistemic
56Although this is controversial—see Gibbard 1981, Stalnaker 1984, Bennett 2003, Williams 2008. I will
grant the assumption for now.
57One might think that it is false merely on the grounds that Pete has the losing hand. However, as
DeRose 2010 points out, Zack may think it very likely that Pete has the losing hand (just stipulate that
Mr. Stone’s hand is very good), and still have every reason to accept (38). Yet if Pete having the losing
hand were in fact sufficient to falsify (38), then Zack thinking it very likely that Pete has the losing hand
should lead him to think it very likely that (38) is false, in which case he would have good reason reject it.
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conditional—hence about what some relevant agent knows or presupposes (cf. Ramsey
1931, Stalnaker 1975, Warmbrod 1983, Weatherson 2001, Williams 2008). On such a theory,
the truth of an indicative conditional is relative to an information state. In evaluating (38)
with respect to Zack’s information, we add its antecedent to that information, while also
adding other propositions about how its antecedent must have come to be given its addition
to what he knows. (38) is true relative to Zack’s information state because the modified
information state (with the supposition of the antecedent) entails that Pete won. We may
call this sort of reasoning ‘backtracking,’ but it isn’t the same thing as what happens when
a counterfactual has a backtracking interpretation. Rather, it is just a byproduct of what
normally happens when we evaluate an indicative conditional according to the ‘Ramsey
test’—we suppose its antecedent, making the requisite changes to add it to our information
state. Since both Jack and Zack engage in this process in evaluating (38), and since their
two information states are on a par (both are ignorant of some relevant fact—Zack that
Pete has the losing hand, and Jack that Pete knows Stone’s hand), there is no asymmetry
between the two interpretations. Thus, we predict this difference between (2) and (38).
5.5 Underspecified antecedents
Objector: Consider the following scenario (from Bennett 2003: 219-220, who attributes
it to Nute 1980):
Thieves. Unbeknownst to John, two thieves, Slim and Tim, were vying for his
jacket at the restaurant. At 1:00pm, when John was in the bathroom, Slim
made a move for the jacket, but was thwarted by the server, who happened by
the table. At 1:05pm, when John was paying the check, Tim made his move,
but was unable to nab it thanks again to the server, who bumped into him.
(39) If John’s jacket had been stolen from the restaurant, it would now be in the
possession of Tim.
Intuitively, (39) strikes us as unassertable given the information in Thieves. But accord-
ing to Default, later admissible counterfactual times are better candidates for the default
counterfactual time. If that is so, then we seem to predict, incorrectly, that (39) should be
true and known (and hence assertable).
Reply: This objection gives me the opportunity to discuss the important issue of an-
tecedent underdetermination, an issue already raised in footnote 33 but set aside until
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now. Probably all natural language counterfactual antecedents are underdetermined—
that is, they do not specify which of several possible ways they are to be (hypothetically)
realized. For instance, the antecedent of (39) is underdetermined: one way for John’s coat
to have been stolen is for Tim to have stolen John’s coat, and another is for Slim to have
stolen John’s coat. Now that we have the notion of antecedent underdetermination on
the table, to see that the issue raised by the Thieves example is one about antecedent
underdetermination, notice that the same point can be made without distinguishing the
times at which Tim and Slim make their moves:
Thieves-2. Unbeknownst to John, two thieves, Slim and Tim, were vying for
his jacket at the restaurant. Both planned to steal John’s jacket whenever he
was off-guard, but neither got the chance.
Just as in Thieves, (39) seems unassertable, given the information stated in Thieves-2.
Thus, it seems that the reason (39) is unassertable should be the same in both scenarios.
But since there is nothing about time mentioned in Thieves-2, it is unlikely that the
former example is a problem about counterfactual time, in particular.
So why do we judge (39) unassertable in these contexts? An offhand diagnosis is that
in these contexts there are two salient ways of realizing (39)’s antecedent: Slim stealing
John’s coat and Tim stealing John’s coat. Furthermore, both ways are possible, given the
background information. That is, it is possible that had John’s jacket been stolen, it would
have been stolen by Slim; and it is possible that had John’s jacket been stolen, it would
have been stolen by Tim. Hence, (39) is unassertable because it is not known, given the
information in the case.
To incorporate this insight into our semantics, I propose to think of ways of realizing
a proposition A as the truthmakers for A (in a vein similar to Fine 2012a,b, although my
theory will make a very different use of this idea). For our purposes, we may simply hold
that a truthmaker for A at w is a proposition that is true at w and entails A. Although I
won’t offer an account of what makes a truthmaker for a proposition salient in a context,
it seems plausible that in Thieves and Thieves-2, the two c-salient truthmakers for (39)’s
antecedent are that it is stolen by Tim and that it is stolen by by Slim, since in both
contexts it is explicitly stated that both Tim and Slim in fact attempted to steal John’s
coat. Finally, we modify our account of Possible antecedent to make use of this extra
machinery by ensuring that the resulting counterfactual domain is compatible with each
of the c-salient truthmakers for A:
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Possible antecedent*: Counterfactual time t must be such that, for each c-salient
truthmaker for A, An: Dc(A
n, w, t) 6= ∅.
With these modifications to our theory in place, let us return to Thieves. Since both that
Slim stole John’s jacket and that Tim stole John’s jacket are salient truthmakers in that
context for (39)’s antecedent, by Possible antecedent*, the counterfactual time for (39)
must be before the times those propositions are about. Hence, we predict that both of the
following are possible, given the information in Thieves:
(40) a. If John’s jacket had been stolen from the restaurant, it would have been stolen
by Tim.
b. If John’s jacket had been stolen from the restaurant, it would have been stolen
by Slim.
Therefore, since (39) is known only if it is known which of (40-a)/(40-b) is the case, (39)
is predicted to be unknown and hence unassertable.58
Appendix
Counterfactuals and informativity
I here explore whether informativity may constrain the default interpretation of coun-
terfactuals. Let ‘At C’ denote the proposition expressed by A  C as interpreted
with counterfactual time t (that is, {w : Dc(A, w, t) ⊆ C}). My first observation is that, if
the relevant causal sufficiencies and facts differ between worlds, then for any times t < t′,
neither At C nor At′ C will strictly entail the other. To illustrate why, consider the
following simple example involving the following three worlds:
58Thanks to audiences at MIT and at the Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference for helpful feedback
on earlier drafts. In particular, thanks to Simona Aimar, Andy Egan, Tom Dougherty, Irene Heim, Aron
Hirsch, Brendan Jackson, Josh Knobe, Rose Lenehan, Karen Lewis, Matt Mandelkern, Vann McGee, Sarah
Moss, Dilip Ninan, David Plunkett, Bernhard Salow, Raul Saucedo, Jonathan Schaffer, Joshua Schechter,
Miriam Schoenfield, Ginger Schultheis, Brad Skow, Bob Stalnaker, Eric Swanson, Zolta´n Gendler Szabo´,
and Steve Yablo for insightful comments.
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w1: A // B //
>
>>
>>
>>
C
>
>>
>>
>>
D // E
t1 t2 t3 t4
w2: A //
>
>>
>>
>>
B // C
?
??
??
??
D // D’ // E
t1 t2 t3 t4
w3: A // B // C
=
==
==
==
E
Now consider the following counterfactual, ¬C E, and assume that D is salient. Given
our semantics, it follows that Ct2 E true at w1, but Ct1 E is false at w1. Therefore,
Ct2 E does not entail Ct1 E.
• Why Ct2 E is true at w1. Dc(C, w1, t2) entails A and B (by historical).
Furthermore, since D is caused in the same way at D-worlds in HSCt2 as it is at w1
(caused by B), by hindsight, Dc(C, w1, t2) |= D. Finally, since D ⊃ E is a causal
sufficiency of w1 about times later than t2, Dc(C, w1, t2) |= D ⊃ E (by causal).
Hence, by closure, Dc(C, w1, t2) |= E.
• Why Ct1 E is false at w1. HSCt1 |= B ⊃ C (since B ⊃ C is a causal sufficiency of
w1 about times after t1). However, since HS
C
t1 |= C, by closure, HSCt1 |= B. Thus, D
is not caused in the same way at D-worlds in HSCt1 as it is at w1. At w1, D is caused
by B, but B does not cause D at any D-world in HSCt1 , since B is false at every one of
those worlds. Hence, hindsight does not ensure that Dc(C, w1, t1) |= D. But notice
that nothing else in the theory ensures this, so Dc(C, w1, t1) 6|= D. And therefore,
since the same reasoning applies to E, Dc(C, w1, t1) 6|= E.
Next, Ct1 E is true at w2 but Ct2 E is false at w3. So, Ct1 E does not entail
62
Ct2 E.
• Why Ct1 E is true at w2. Dc(C, w2, t1) entails A (by historical). However,
it also entails D′, by hindsight. This is because D′ is caused in the same way at
D′-worlds in HSCt1 as it is at w2 (being caused by D which is caused by A). And by
causal, Dc(C, w2, t1) |= D′ ⊃ E. Therefore, Dc(C, w2, t1) |= E.
• Why Ct2 E is false at w3. Note that the only way Dc(C, w3, t2) would entail E is
by hindsight, since no causal sufficiencies will entailed by Dc(C, w3, t2) will ensure
that it entails E. But then notice that E is not caused in the same way at E-worlds in
HSCt2 as it is at w3. At w3, E is caused by C which is caused by B. At no E-world in
HSCt2 is it caused by C. So, hindsight does not ensure that Dc(C, w3, t2) |= E. But
then nothing ensures this. Thus, Dc(C, w3, t2) 6|= E.
Therefore, since it is generally the case that the worlds in W (or compatible with what
is presupposed, or perhaps taken to be known) differ with respect to the relevant causal
sufficiencies and facts, it will almost always be the case that neither temporal interpre-
tation is more informative in the relevant sense (of strictly entailing the less informative
interpretation), and thus informativity will generally provide no additional constraint
on interpretation.
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